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AbSTRACT
In 2006, the US Army adopted a new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, Field 
Manual 3-24. The doctrine establishes new guidelines for conducting operations 
such as those currently taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq, where its validity 
is being tested. It is also a turning point in the US Army’s doctrinal approach to 
such operations as it fully embraces the “small war” approach to COIN. Ear-
lier post-Vietnam Army doctrine has had an ambivalent view of the small war 
approach, which is contrary to the Army’s traditional preference for fighting 
big-scale, conventional wars. While earlier post-Vietnam COIN doctrines have 
used the conflicts in Vietnam and El Salvador as models, FM 3-24 takes into ac-
count many other possible forms of insurgency as well. It also recognizes more 
clearly the key role of popular legitimacy and accepts a potentially much more 
extensive degree of Army involvement. Furthermore, FM 3-24 wholeheartedly 
argues that political concerns should take precedence over strictly military ones 
when applying force. COIN operations are viewed as a long-term commitment. 
The doctrine may help to fill a gap in US military capabilities, but this ultimately 
requires a change in the Army’s mindset and in US national strategic culture.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2006 the US Army and the US Marine Corps adopted a new coun-
terinsurgency doctrine, known to the Army as Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24) 
and to the Marines as Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5 (MCWP 
3-33.5). These somewhat dry designations barely hint at the document’s signifi-
cance. Arguably, the new manual represents a dramatic shift in Army doctrine 
and it may have revolutionary ramifications for the Army as an institution as 
well as for US military capabilities. The doctrine is intended to guide the conduct 
of US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and may thus affect the outcome of 
those conflicts, but it may also have a wider impact. FM 3-24 prescribes a new 
and different approach to operations, which may in turn require far-reaching 
changes in training, procurement, and organization. Ultimately, the doctrine 
may serve as a catalyst for a new direction of Army transformation and a dra-
matic enhancement of the Army as an instrument of US policy. Given these char-
acteristics of the new doctrine it certainly merits in-depth studies. A few studies 
have addressed various aspects of the doctrine,2 and the present paper expands 
upon that analysis.
The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that FM 3-24 represents 
a substantial change in US Army counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. The na-
ture of the change will be characterized and gauged by placing the new doctrine 
in a historical context and relating it to the development of Army COIN doc-
trine since the Vietnam War.
In his book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, John A. Nagl refers to 
the aphorism of T. E. Lawrence (“Lawrence of Arabia”) that “Making war on 
insurgents is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.” Nagl likens the 
process of transforming the US Army into a fully capable COIN force to a pro-
1 This paper was presented at the war studies seminar at the Swedish National Defence 
College. I would like to thank my discussant, Anders Palmgren, Jan Angstrom, who 
chaired the seminar, and the other participants for a fruitful discussion. I would also 
like to thank a number of colleagues at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies 
for their valuable comments: Kjell Inge Bjerga, Kjetil Henriksen, Michael Mayer, 
and Svein Melby. Last but not least, I want to thank Anna Therese Klingstedt for her 
excellent editorial work. The paper is part of my ongoing study of American doctrine 
for using conventional forces since the end of the Vietnam War. The study examines 
doctrine from the national security policy level to the operational level, including joint 
military doctrine as well as service doctrine. It is due to be finished in 2008.
2 To the best of my knowledge, the most thorough study of the new doctrine so far is 
James S. Corum’s “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 28, no. 1 (2007). FM 3-24 is also briefly addressed in Steven 
Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), p. 65; and Thomas R. Mockaitis, The Iraq War: 
Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), pp. 50–51 and 53–54.
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cess of learning to eat soup with a knife.3 In doctrinal terms, FM 3-24 may be 
described as a decisive step in that direction. The 2006 doctrine was preceded 
by a temporary version issued in 2004. As James S. Corum points out: “Prior 
to the 2004 doctrine, the last official counter-insurgency doctrine field manual 
had been published in 1966.” The 2004 and 2006 field manuals thus represent 
a dramatic revival of COIN in US Army doctrine. FM 3-24 holds a central place 
in the Army’s doctrinal hierarchy in its capacity as “one of the ‘capstone’ Army 
doctrine manuals, that is, one of six field manuals that set out the basic prin-
ciples of warfare and operations for the whole Army, and serves as a foundation 
document for tactical and unit-specific doctrine on COIN and stability opera-
tions.”4
What, more specifically, is a doctrine and why should we study it? Corum’s 
description, quoted above, gives us some guidance, and other analysts have 
addressed these issues as well. According to one of them, Robert M. Cassidy, 
“Doctrine is salient because it is central to how militaries execute their missions 
– it is how [they] operate. Doctrine, therefore, is an authoritative expression of 
a military’s fundamental approach to fighting wars and influencing events in op-
erations other than war.” Of the American services, the Army is the one in which 
doctrine plays the most central role. Its system for developing and revising doc-
trine is highly institutionalized and the Army has been described as a doctrine-
based institution. Doctrine may thus be regarded an important expression of the 
Army’s mindset, i.e. how the Army as an institution proposes to handle the tasks 
given to it. Richard Duncan Downie has argued that published Army doctrine 
reflects the service’s culture and preferences, to some extent including informal 
norms, and James A. Blackwell has described doctrine as the Army’s “profes-
sional cognitive map.” The doctrinal importance of various types of operations 
indicates which scenarios the Army focuses its mental and organizational efforts 
on, and which scenarios it is less ready to tackle.5
3 John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago, IL & London: Chicago University Press, 2005). For 
Nagl’s reference to Lawrence, see p. xii. Nagl’s study is a revised version of his PhD 
thesis. He is a US Army major with personal experience from COIN operations in 
Iraq.
4 Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 128 and 132.
5 For Cassidy’s definition, see his Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American 
Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 
p. 3. On the centrality of doctrine to the ArmyArmy, see, e.g., James A. Blackwell, 
“Professionalism and Army Doctrine: A Losing Battle?,” in The Future of the Army 
Profession, eds. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill; 
2nd edition), pp. 325–326. Blackwell uses the concept “professional cognitive map” on 
p. 329. For Downie’s argument, see his Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in 
Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1998), pp. 43 and 
122.
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Doctrinal definitions of COIN and the related concept of insurgency have 
shifted over time, but for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to relate the 
current definitions used by FM 3-24 which are in turn based on joint doctrine:
Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed 
conflict […]. Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted 
politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an 
established government, occupying power, or other political authority while in-
creasing insurgent control. Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, politi-
cal, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat 
insurgency […].6
The rationale for using the Vietnam War as a point of departure has to do with 
its role as a watershed not only in American national security affairs in gen-
eral, but in the US Army’s doctrinal development as well. The fundamentals of 
doctrine tend to evolve slowly, over the course of decades rather than years. In 
important respects the Army of today and its doctrine are products of reforms 
undertaken in the wake of the Vietnam War.7 Not least important in the present 
context, the Vietnam trauma has significantly shaped Army COIN doctrine over 
a long period of time. I therefore hope that tracing Army COIN doctrine since 
the Vietnam War will help identify, characterize, and gauge the doctrinal change 
represented by FM 3-24, thus fulfilling the paper’s main purposes.
To this end I have developed and applied an analytical framework. The 
framework, which is outlined in greater detail in the next section, distinguishes 
between two approaches to COIN; the big war approach and the small war 
approach. The bulk of the analysis characterizes the development of US Army 
COIN doctrine by relating it to this framework. The analysis of the period from 
the Vietnam War to the beginning of the “Global War on Terror” is primar-
ily based on the findings of previous research which are being integrated and 
synthesized. The last part of the analysis consists of applying the framework to 
primary sources, i.e. FM 3-24 and its two immediate precursors, Field Manual 
3-07, Stability Operations (2003) and Field Manual, Interim 3-07.22, Counter-
6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, 
DC, 2006), 1-2, p. 1-1; italics in the original. These definitions are also used in 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations 
(Washington, DC, 2004), p. vi and 1-1, p. 1-1.
7 On Vietnam as a watershed and the enduring impact of doctrinal and other changes 
that took place in the immediate post-Vietnam era, see, e.g., Frederick W. Kagan, 
Finding the Target. The Transformation of American Military Policy (New York, NY: 
Encounter Books, 2006), pp. 3–5; and Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy 
and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq (London & New York, NY: Routledge, 
2006), p. 2.
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insurgency Operations (2004). Covering doctrinal development over a longer 
period of time entails the risk of neglecting important nuances, but hopefully 
the benefits of being able to identify long-term trends will outweigh this disad-
vantage.
While the present study focuses on the importance and contents of a spe-
cific body of doctrine, i.e. Army COIN doctrine, it considers this doctrinal evo-
lution in relation to certain other aspects. As a systematic explanation of the 
doctrinal development is outside the scope of this study I do not analyze these 
factors in depth, but they are touched upon to provide a context. For example, 
conditions in the international environment, and their implications for US secu-
rity, are often outlined. Furthermore, the overall development of Army doctrine 
will be discussed, and US national security policies and so-called use-of-force 
doctrines are also used as a backdrop for the analysis.8
Another interesting aspect is the relationship between doctrine and actions, 
in this case the actual conduct of Army COIN operations. In this study I pri-
marily deal with formal, written doctrine. In other words, informal doctrine or 
the relationship between doctrine and practice are not systematically examined. 
Given the central role of doctrine to the Army as an institution, it seems reason-
able to assume that it has a more or less substantial effect on the conduct of 
Army operations. However, many other factors may be relevant as well, such 
as the circumstances in a given situation and the resources at the commander’s 
disposal. A direct and simple causal linkage between doctrine and the conduct 
of operations cannot be taken for granted.9 A doctrinal analysis could be taken 
one step further and include the relationship between doctrine, action, and the 
outcome of operations. Such an analysis is even more complicated, as it has to 
take into account additional factors, including enemy behavior and resources.
Doctrine can also be analyzed in the context of Army capabilities. The 
promulgation of FM 3-24 can be seen as part of a broader trend at the Army and 
national level. Enhancing COIN capabilities is currently official US policy. The 
8 While ArmyArmy doctrine pertains to how the ArmyArmy operates, use-of-force 
doctrines are found at the level of national security policy. They are thus formally 
superordinate to ArmyArmy doctrine and are broader in scope, as they deal with 
how the US should use military power as a means to implement national policies. 
For further discussion of the doctrinal hierarchy, see, for example, Arnel B. Enriquez, 
”The US National Security Strategy of 2002: A New Use-of-Force Doctrine?,” Air 
& Space Power Journal, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (2004), p. 32. For my analysis of use of 
force doctrines, see Olof Kronvall, ”Is the Bush Doctrine an Anomaly? American 
Use-of-Force Doctrines from Vietnam to the War on Terror,” in Säkerhet och 
försvar. En vänbok till Kent Zetterberg [Security and Defense. A Festschrift to Kent 
Zetterberg], eds. Gunnar Artéus, Karl Molin and Magnus Petersson (Karlskrona: Axel 
Abrahamssons Tryckeri och förlag, 2005).
9 For a critical discussion, see, for example, Thomas A. Marks, “Introduction,” p. 99; 
and p. 103 in Ed O’Dowd’s review of  John Nagl’s Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam; both articles appeared in Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 17, 
no. 1 (2006).
Pentagon’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR 2006) repeatedly 
mentions the need for improving COIN capabilities in order to wage the war on 
terror, or “the Long War,” more effectively. Part of the document’s vision for the 
development of joint ground forces reads as follows: “Future warriors will be 
as proficient in irregular operations, including counterinsurgency and stabiliza-
tion operations, as they are today in high-intensity combat.”10 COIN operations 
have traditionally been an Achilles heel of American policy and being able to 
handle them effectively would fill a gap in terms of US military capabilities, thus 
further amplifying the superpower’s strength. If the QDR’s vision actually ma-
terializes it will provide US policy-makers with a potent instrument that has not 
been at their disposal before, at least not on the scale and with the permanence 
hypothesized here.
The promulgation of FM 3-24 is arguably a step in that direction. But 
while doctrine may be a crucial factor in the development of military capabili-
ties it can be assumed that in order to have a full impact it must be matched by 
appropriate organization, training, equipment, etc. Ideally a doctrine used as 
the basis for developing capabilities should also be sound, i.e. based on a correct 
assessment of the problems which it is designed to handle.
To sum up, then, all of these aspects – the causes of doctrinal change; the 
relationship between doctrine, action, and outcomes; and doctrine as a compo-
nent of military capabilities – are intriguing, but also highly complex. Systemati-
cally studying any of them is beyond the scope of the paper. Put another way, 
the doctrinal analysis proposed in the following pages cannot strictly speaking 
answer the question posed in the title of the paper, i.e. whether the US Army is 
now fighting insurgents in the way prescribed by Lawrence and others. Howev-
er, by fulfilling the more limited purposes stated above and providing an analysis 
of the doctrinal development it sheds light on phenomena that are interesting in 
their own right. This analysis may also serve as a point of departure for stud-
ies with a broader scope. Furthermore, while the bulk of this paper focuses on 
doctrinal content, the related aspects mentioned above are addressed tentatively 
in the concluding section.
The next section presents the analytical framework utilized in the paper. 
It describes two basic approaches to COIN, termed the big war approach and 
the small war approach. In the following three sections this framework is ap-
plied to US Army COIN doctrine since the Vietnam War. Regarding the im-
portance of COIN in Army doctrine, I argue that FM 3-24 and its immediate 
precursor, FMI 3-07.22 from 2004, represent a dramatically heightened doc-
10 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006 
(Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2006; henceforth QDR 2006); the quotation may be 
found on p. 42. See also pp. 3–4, 23, 36, 38, 83, and 91.
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insurgency Operations (2004). Covering doctrinal development over a longer 
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of operations cannot be taken for granted.9 A doctrinal analysis could be taken 
one step further and include the relationship between doctrine, action, and the 
outcome of operations. Such an analysis is even more complicated, as it has to 
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For further discussion of the doctrinal hierarchy, see, for example, Arnel B. Enriquez, 
”The US National Security Strategy of 2002: A New Use-of-Force Doctrine?,” Air 
& Space Power Journal, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (2004), p. 32. For my analysis of use of 
force doctrines, see Olof Kronvall, ”Is the Bush Doctrine an Anomaly? American 
Use-of-Force Doctrines from Vietnam to the War on Terror,” in Säkerhet och 
försvar. En vänbok till Kent Zetterberg [Security and Defense. A Festschrift to Kent 
Zetterberg], eds. Gunnar Artéus, Karl Molin and Magnus Petersson (Karlskrona: Axel 
Abrahamssons Tryckeri och förlag, 2005).
9 For a critical discussion, see, for example, Thomas A. Marks, “Introduction,” p. 99; 
and p. 103 in Ed O’Dowd’s review of  John Nagl’s Counterinsurgency Lessons from 
Malaya and Vietnam; both articles appeared in Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 17, 
no. 1 (2006).
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been at their disposal before, at least not on the scale and with the permanence 
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ties it can be assumed that in order to have a full impact it must be matched by 
appropriate organization, training, equipment, etc. Ideally a doctrine used as 
the basis for developing capabilities should also be sound, i.e. based on a correct 
assessment of the problems which it is designed to handle.
To sum up, then, all of these aspects – the causes of doctrinal change; the 
relationship between doctrine, action, and outcomes; and doctrine as a compo-
nent of military capabilities – are intriguing, but also highly complex. Systemati-
cally studying any of them is beyond the scope of the paper. Put another way, 
the doctrinal analysis proposed in the following pages cannot strictly speaking 
answer the question posed in the title of the paper, i.e. whether the US Army is 
now fighting insurgents in the way prescribed by Lawrence and others. Howev-
er, by fulfilling the more limited purposes stated above and providing an analysis 
of the doctrinal development it sheds light on phenomena that are interesting in 
their own right. This analysis may also serve as a point of departure for stud-
ies with a broader scope. Furthermore, while the bulk of this paper focuses on 
doctrinal content, the related aspects mentioned above are addressed tentatively 
in the concluding section.
The next section presents the analytical framework utilized in the paper. 
It describes two basic approaches to COIN, termed the big war approach and 
the small war approach. In the following three sections this framework is ap-
plied to US Army COIN doctrine since the Vietnam War. Regarding the im-
portance of COIN in Army doctrine, I argue that FM 3-24 and its immediate 
precursor, FMI 3-07.22 from 2004, represent a dramatically heightened doc-
10 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006 
(Washington, DC: Pentagon, 2006; henceforth QDR 2006); the quotation may be 
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trinal interest in COIN. Regarding the substance of COIN doctrine, I argue 
that throughout the post-Vietnam era US Army COIN doctrine has contained 
a mix of small war elements and big war elements. FM 3-24 represents an im-
portant change in this respect, as arguably it signals a whole-hearted doctrinal 
acceptance of the small war approach. The final section of the paper sums up 
the main argument and briefly addresses the possible impact of FM 3-24 on 
current operations, Army capabilities and US national security policies.
Two Approaches to Counterinsurgency
Throughout its modern history the US military, including the Army, has been 
dominated by what can be termed, to use Robert M. Cassidy’s expression, the 
big war paradigm. This paradigm has pervaded Army culture, doctrine, and 
training. It entails a preference for fighting the conventional forces of other 
nation-states and defeating them swiftly and completely by applying decisive 
force. While accepting civilian control of the military and the Clausewitzian idea 
that war is fought for political ends, it tends to view war and conflict in rather 
narrowly defined military terms and emphasizes that political considerations 
ideally should not infringe on military efficiency. The Army has repeatedly per-
formed other types of operations throughout its history, but the service has con-
sidered these aberrations, and the experiences learned from them were normally 
not absorbed systematically. Army COIN doctrine has often essentially been 
derived from the big war paradigm. Put simply, whenever Army doctrine has 
not ignored COIN, it has regarded such operations as a smaller version of the 
preferred big war scenario, and the methods judged appropriate to defeat con-
ventional armies have been considered relevant to fighting insurgents as well.11
A radically different approach to COIN can be termed the small war ap-
proach. This approach, which has been primarily expressed in US Marine Corps 
culture and doctrine, has coexisted with the predominant big war paradigm. The 
roots of the small war approach in its modern form can be traced back to the 
experiences from the so-called Banana Wars in which the Corps was involved 
between the two World Wars. The Banana Wars were a series of interventions in 
11 On the big war paradigm and its implications for COIN, see Robert M. Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. Military Culture and Irregular 
War (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 2–3, 100, 
and 114–126. While Cassidy’s introduction of the concept “big war paradigm” is 
new, his analysis is based on several earlier studies. One of the more influential is 
Russell F. Weigley’s classic The American Way of War. A History of United States 
Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973). For 
an in-depth study of US Army COIN doctrine during the first part of the 20th century, 
see, for example, Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths. The Development of American 
Counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War (New York & London: New York University 
Press, 1986), chapters 2–6.
the Caribbean and Latin America, and what later came to be known as COIN 
was an important component of these operations. The lessons learned were cod-
ified in the 1940 Small Wars Manual, a doctrinal publication that epitomizes the 
small war approach to counterinsurgency.12
Rather than recommending the use of decisive force aimed at the physical 
destruction of insurgent forces the doctrine claimed that political considerations 
must be paramount; consequently they may override strictly military concerns. 
Military operations must be coordinated with diplomacy. The struggle between 
the government and the insurgents was viewed as being essentially a contest for 
popular legitimacy. The party that could gain and keep legitimacy in the eyes 
of the people was also likely to win the struggle for sovereignty. The manual 
called for working in concert with indigenous forces and stressed the importance 
of understanding and taking into account local cultural, social, and economic 
conditions. Political stability could not be achieved without ensuring economic 
prosperity. The manual also stated that “In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and 
kindness should be the keynote to our relationship with the mass of the popula-
tion.”13 Excessive force should thus be avoided, although force was deemed nec-
essary to defeat the insurgency. But in order to be effective, it must be combined 
with the use of political and diplomatic instruments, and it should be applied 
in the guise of aggressive patrolling and population security measures aimed 
at denying sanctuary to the insurgents, rather than big unit operations against 
enemy units.
Although the Marine Corps has been the clearest proponent within the US 
military of the small wars approach to COIN, one can hardly talk about a con-
comitant small wars paradigm equivalent to the big war paradigm. The Small 
Wars Manual comes close to promoting such a paradigm, as it states that “small 
wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps.” But 
the Marine Corps and its doctrine have not been consistently preoccupied with 
small wars; for considerable periods of time such considerations have been 
eclipsed by big war concerns. This was the case from World War II until the 
early 1960s. However, Marine Corps operations in Vietnam were considerably 
influenced by the spirit of the Small Wars Manual, and an updated version of the 
document was also released in 2004.14
12 The following description of the Small Wars Manual is based on Cable, Conflict of 
Myths, pp. 161–163 and 167–169; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace. Small Wars 
and the Rise of American Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 283–285; 
and Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 130 and 135.
13 See, for example, Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 284.
14 For examples of big war concerns eclipsing the small war approach, see Cable, 
Conflict of Myths, pp. 170–171; and Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 285. On the 
doctrinal heritage and Marine Corps operations in Vietnam, see, for example, Cable, 
Conflict of Myths, chapter 9 and p 284; and Boot, pp. 304–307. The quotation from 
the Small Wars Manual can be found in Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 284.
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narrowly defined military terms and emphasizes that political considerations 
ideally should not infringe on military efficiency. The Army has repeatedly per-
formed other types of operations throughout its history, but the service has con-
sidered these aberrations, and the experiences learned from them were normally 
not absorbed systematically. Army COIN doctrine has often essentially been 
derived from the big war paradigm. Put simply, whenever Army doctrine has 
not ignored COIN, it has regarded such operations as a smaller version of the 
preferred big war scenario, and the methods judged appropriate to defeat con-
ventional armies have been considered relevant to fighting insurgents as well.11
A radically different approach to COIN can be termed the small war ap-
proach. This approach, which has been primarily expressed in US Marine Corps 
culture and doctrine, has coexisted with the predominant big war paradigm. The 
roots of the small war approach in its modern form can be traced back to the 
experiences from the so-called Banana Wars in which the Corps was involved 
between the two World Wars. The Banana Wars were a series of interventions in 
11 On the big war paradigm and its implications for COIN, see Robert M. Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. Military Culture and Irregular 
War (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 2–3, 100, 
and 114–126. While Cassidy’s introduction of the concept “big war paradigm” is 
new, his analysis is based on several earlier studies. One of the more influential is 
Russell F. Weigley’s classic The American Way of War. A History of United States 
Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973). For 
an in-depth study of US Army COIN doctrine during the first part of the 20th century, 
see, for example, Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths. The Development of American 
Counterinsurgency and the Vietnam War (New York & London: New York University 
Press, 1986), chapters 2–6.
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destruction of insurgent forces the doctrine claimed that political considerations 
must be paramount; consequently they may override strictly military concerns. 
Military operations must be coordinated with diplomacy. The struggle between 
the government and the insurgents was viewed as being essentially a contest for 
popular legitimacy. The party that could gain and keep legitimacy in the eyes 
of the people was also likely to win the struggle for sovereignty. The manual 
called for working in concert with indigenous forces and stressed the importance 
of understanding and taking into account local cultural, social, and economic 
conditions. Political stability could not be achieved without ensuring economic 
prosperity. The manual also stated that “In small wars, tolerance, sympathy, and 
kindness should be the keynote to our relationship with the mass of the popula-
tion.”13 Excessive force should thus be avoided, although force was deemed nec-
essary to defeat the insurgency. But in order to be effective, it must be combined 
with the use of political and diplomatic instruments, and it should be applied 
in the guise of aggressive patrolling and population security measures aimed 
at denying sanctuary to the insurgents, rather than big unit operations against 
enemy units.
Although the Marine Corps has been the clearest proponent within the US 
military of the small wars approach to COIN, one can hardly talk about a con-
comitant small wars paradigm equivalent to the big war paradigm. The Small 
Wars Manual comes close to promoting such a paradigm, as it states that “small 
wars represent the normal and frequent operations of the Marine Corps.” But 
the Marine Corps and its doctrine have not been consistently preoccupied with 
small wars; for considerable periods of time such considerations have been 
eclipsed by big war concerns. This was the case from World War II until the 
early 1960s. However, Marine Corps operations in Vietnam were considerably 
influenced by the spirit of the Small Wars Manual, and an updated version of the 
document was also released in 2004.14
12 The following description of the Small Wars Manual is based on Cable, Conflict of 
Myths, pp. 161–163 and 167–169; Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace. Small Wars 
and the Rise of American Power (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 283–285; 
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Based on this broad description of two contrary approaches to COIN, an 
analytical framework, consisting of five interrelated aspects, can be distilled. 
This framework is used to characterize the development of Army COIN doctrine 
over time by determining the relative emphasis on elements associated with the 
big war and the small war approach respectively.
It is important to note that the labels big war and small war can be mis-
leading in one important respect, as these terms may seem to suggest that the 
decisive difference between the two approaches is of a quantitative nature, based 
on the scale of the conflicts they are designed to deal with. While the scale of 
those conflicts may indeed differ, this is not necessarily the most important dis-
tinction between the two approaches. Instead, the crucial distinction is actually 
a qualitative one, since the two approaches prescribe very different methods 
for achieving victory in COIN. But despite these conceptual drawbacks, the big 
war/small war distinction is still useful as shorthand for the two main directions 
in COIN doctrine that are under discussion here.
It should also be remembered that the framework is somewhat schematic. 
By no means does it claim to capture the full complexity of American COIN 
doctrine, let alone US military doctrine in general. This is a multifaceted body 
of thought which cannot be fully described and understood through the use 
of a few key words, or through any one analytical model. While these limita-
tions should be kept in mind, it is also true that any analysis requires a measure 
of simplification. As discussed above, important nuances may be lost due to 
the inclusion of a decades-long time period, and the schematic character of the 
framework may have a similar effect. However, the framework will hopefully 
enable the identification of certain important trends and thus compensate for 
these possible deficiencies.
The first aspect of the framework is how the various doctrines view the 
character of insurgency. This includes assumptions regarding the dynamics, pur-
pose, and methods of insurgency. Compared to the other aspects, this one is not 
necessarily as directly linked to the two approaches to COIN, but it facilitates 
the analysis and understanding of the other aspects.
The second aspect is the basis for COIN strategy. Here, two basic prefer-
ences can be discerned; one that tends to define victory in military terms, and 
another one that tends to define victory in political terms. The first preference 
is associated with the big war approach and the second one with the small war 
approach.
The third aspect is the degree of Army involvement prescribed by the doc-
trines. It is assumed that a restrictive and narrowly defined Army role in COIN 
efforts is an expression of the big war approach, whereas an acceptance of a 
more extensive role is an expression of the small war approach.
The fourth aspect concerns the use of force. An emphasis on applying force 
in the manner which is deemed most efficient in a strictly military sense, i.e. to 
defeat enemy forces militarily, is considered an expression of the big war ap-
proach. Conversely, making the use of force dependent on its likely political 
effects is considered an expression of the small war approach.
The fifth aspect concerns the time frame envisioned for COIN operations. 
Here, the big war approach conceives of COIN operations, at least as far as the 
Army is concerned, as a short-term engagement. The small war approach, on the 
other hand, advocates a long-term commitment, which it perceives as an integral 
component of successful COIN operations.
Admittedly, other aspects could have been included as well (or instead), 
such as the relative importance of intelligence, the priority of force protection 
vs. interaction with the populace, and preferences for big unit or small unit 
operations. These or other expansions or alterations of the analytical frame-
work could lead to different results. At the same time, it should be noted that 
some findings from earlier research seem to reinforce the overall argument ad-
vanced in this paper. In his article, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency 
Doctrine,” James S. Corum notes that the new doctrine emphasizes the need for 
understanding the culture in the countries where the Army is involved in COIN, 
as well as the importance of psychological and media operations. Both of these 
features may be seen as expressions of a small war approach to COIN.15 At any 
rate, despite the reservations noted above, I believe that the aspects included in 
the framework will be sufficient to capture the overall direction of the doctrinal 
development. In the following sections, the framework outlined above is applied 
to US Army COIN doctrine from the Vietnam War to the “Global War on Ter-
ror.”
15 See Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 134 and 138. 
On cultural understanding as an aspect of the small war approach, see the above 
description of the Small Wars Manual. The emphasis on psychological and media 
operations can be linked to the small war approach’s concern with achieving popular 
legitimacy. This connection is suggested by Corum on p. 138.
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It should also be remembered that the framework is somewhat schematic. 
By no means does it claim to capture the full complexity of American COIN 
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ences can be discerned; one that tends to define victory in military terms, and 
another one that tends to define victory in political terms. The first preference 
is associated with the big war approach and the second one with the small war 
approach.
The third aspect is the degree of Army involvement prescribed by the doc-
trines. It is assumed that a restrictive and narrowly defined Army role in COIN 
efforts is an expression of the big war approach, whereas an acceptance of a 
more extensive role is an expression of the small war approach.
The fourth aspect concerns the use of force. An emphasis on applying force 
in the manner which is deemed most efficient in a strictly military sense, i.e. to 
defeat enemy forces militarily, is considered an expression of the big war ap-
proach. Conversely, making the use of force dependent on its likely political 
effects is considered an expression of the small war approach.
The fifth aspect concerns the time frame envisioned for COIN operations. 
Here, the big war approach conceives of COIN operations, at least as far as the 
Army is concerned, as a short-term engagement. The small war approach, on the 
other hand, advocates a long-term commitment, which it perceives as an integral 
component of successful COIN operations.
Admittedly, other aspects could have been included as well (or instead), 
such as the relative importance of intelligence, the priority of force protection 
vs. interaction with the populace, and preferences for big unit or small unit 
operations. These or other expansions or alterations of the analytical frame-
work could lead to different results. At the same time, it should be noted that 
some findings from earlier research seem to reinforce the overall argument ad-
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understanding the culture in the countries where the Army is involved in COIN, 
as well as the importance of psychological and media operations. Both of these 
features may be seen as expressions of a small war approach to COIN.15 At any 
rate, despite the reservations noted above, I believe that the aspects included in 
the framework will be sufficient to capture the overall direction of the doctrinal 
development. In the following sections, the framework outlined above is applied 
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ror.”
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The Vietnam Legacy6
A central concern of the security policies of the John F. Kennedy Administra-
tion (1961–63) was to check Soviet and Chinese influence in the Third World. It 
was believed that the communist powers initiated and exploited various forms 
of insurgencies and that purely military approaches were often insufficient to 
tackle this challenge. Instead, when trying to stamp out insurgencies in the Third 
World, US forces should also engage in so-called nation-building in concert with 
civilian government agencies, such as the State Department. It was believed that 
an insurgent movement could not win, i.e. overthrow the government, without 
significant popular support, and nation-building operations ultimately aimed 
at depriving the insurgents of legitimacy. The means to achieve this was to im-
prove the living conditions of the population in the threatened country so as to 
reduce any grievances that might otherwise be exploited by the insurgents. Na-
tion-building operations entailed developing the infrastructure of the country in 
question, or distributing food and medicine in poor, rural areas.
In important respects, the ideas behind nation-building were a mirror im-
age of the strategy used by America’s communist adversaries, in this case the 
Viet Minh/Viet Cong insurgents, backed by the North Vietnamese government. 
Their strategy was, in turn, based on Mao Zedong’s concept of “people’s war”, 
according to which an insurgency began “when a highly motivated cadre mo-
bilized a support base among the rural peasantry using nationalism and local 
grievances (often including corruption, repression, excessive taxation, and issues 
associated with land ownership).”17 This popular support was to form the basis 
for a phase of guerilla warfare against the government. The insurgents’ military 
operations must be continuously coordinated with political and propaganda op-
erations.  While the government was gradually weakened, politically and mili-
tarily, the insurgents gathered strength. In the final phase of the insurgency, they 
16 On the Army’s attitude to the Vietnam War as a manifestation of the big war 
paradigm, see Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 
114–116. In addition, this section is based on Cable, Conflict of Myths, chapters 
7–14; Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1986); Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American 
Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989), pp. 38 and 185–187; Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions 
and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1994); Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in 
the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War 
College, 2004), pp. 8–10; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment. A Critical 
Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, revised and expanded edition, 2005), chapters 7–8, especially 
pp. 216, 223–224, 247–248, and 251–252; and Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a 
Knife), chapters 3 and 6–9. I have not seen the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations’ 
Vietnam strategies being characterized explicitly in terms of the big war and small 
wars approaches, but such labeling may easily be justified based on the literature.
17 Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 8.
should be capable of turning to large-scale conventional operations, aimed at 
finally defeating the government and taking over power.    
In order to counter such a development in South Vietnam the Kennedy and 
Lyndon B. Johnson Administrations used nation-building as one instrument to 
prop up the government in Saigon and defeat the Viet Cong insurgents. Nation-
building was undertaken parallel to operations of a more conventional nature, 
directly aimed at North Vietnamese territory and forces. This strategy can be 
characterized as a mix of the big war and the small war approaches. By con-
trast, Army efforts were clearly dominated by the big war approach, which was 
derived from the overarching big war paradigm.
Following a presidential directive the Army established its own special 
forces, “the Green Berets,” who engaged in nation-building in South Vietnam. 
But the Army’s doctrinal heritage was not very conducive to such ideas. De-
stroying conventional opposing forces through the application of firepower was 
traditionally at the core of Army doctrine. Since Army counterinsurgency doc-
trine was essentially an outgrowth of this basic doctrine it assumed that insur-
gent forces could be defeated in the same way as conventional forces. This was 
the way in which the bulk of Army operations against the Viet Cong was con-
ducted and this doctrine also pervaded the Army’s advisory program in South 
Vietnam.
In accordance with their small war traditions the Marine Corps approached 
the Vietnam insurgency differently, with a greater emphasis on nation-building 
and on gaining the support of the South Vietnamese population, but this did 
not have a significant impact on Army operations. Neither did British advice, 
based on experiences from the relatively successful Malayan counterinsurgency 
campaign (1948–60) in which winning popular legitimacy had been a vital con-
cern.
Whether a different Army counterinsurgency doctrine and strategy could 
have ensured an American victory in Vietnam will remain a  matter of specula-
tion, but it is clear that the doctrine which was in fact used did not bring victory. 
The US leadership increasingly felt that South Vietnam’s sovereignty could not 
be defended at an acceptable cost. As Richard M. Nixon’s administration took 
office in 1969 it initiated US disengagement from the conflict, in which the US 
had been involved with large numbers of ground forces since 1965. Responsibil-
ity for the defense of South Vietnam was gradually shifted to that country itself, 
a process known as “Vietnamization.” The withdrawal was completed in 1973 
and Hanoi conquered South Vietnam in 1975.
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From Vietnam to the End of the Cold War
The loss in Vietnam was traumatic and humiliating for the US. The Vietnam 
experience had a lasting impact on its national security policies, as well as Army 
doctrine. Although the US was still a global power, its attitude to military inter-
vention abroad became more cautious compared to the first two decades of the 
Cold War. Examples of this approach include the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, which 
placed the primary responsibility for the defense of US allies on these countries 
themselves, and the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, which came in the form of a 
declaration by Secretary of Defense (1981–87) Caspar Weinberger. This doc-
trine stated, among other things, that “the commitment of US forces to combat 
should be a last resort.” For  all practical purposes, the Weinberger Doctrine 
excluded the deployment of US forces for nation-building and other operations 
below the threshold of all-out war.18
The evolution of Army doctrine after Vietnam essentially mirrored this 
outlook. The Vietnam War had a significant impact on the US armed forces 
and the Army was arguably the service most deeply affected.19 At the time of 
withdrawal from Vietnam the Army was severely demoralized and barely func-
tioned as an institution. In order to remedy these afflictions and rebuild itself, 
the Army launched a comprehensive reform program that included an oversight 
of Army doctrine under the auspices of the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), established in 1973.
The doctrinal development in the 1970s and 1980s was partly based on a 
specific interpretation of the Vietnam War that acquired the status of conven-
tional Army wisdom. The idea was essentially that the Army’s main mistake in 
Vietnam was not that it paid insufficient attention to nation-building as part of 
18 On the Nixon Doctrine, see, for example, Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the 
Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976 
(Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 191–194. On the Weinberger 
Doctrine, see, for example, Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and 
Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
pp. 46–47; and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From 
Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 131–132. 
19 Unless otherwise specified, the following account of the Army’s overall doctrinal 
development in the 1970s and 1980s is based on Andrew J. Bacevich, The New 
American Militarism. How Americans Are Seduced By War (Oxford, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 34–47; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, pp. 
205–207;  Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam 
to Iraq, chapters 3–4, especially pp. 104–105; and Corum, “Rethinking US Army 
Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 128–129. As is well known, “maneuver warfare” 
was a central concept in this doctrinal evolution. For a recent critical analysis of 
AirLand Battle doctrine and its understanding of the maneuver warfare concept, 
see Torgeir E. Sæveraas, “Maneuver Warfare: Genghis Khan – Blitzkrieg – AirLand 
Battle?” in Torgeir E. Sæveraas and Kjetil Henriksen, Et militært universalmiddel? 
Amerikansk “Maneuver Warfare” og norsk doktrineutvikling [A Military Panacea? 
American ‘Maneuver Warfare’ and Development of Norwegian Doctrine], Oslo Files 
on Defence and Security, no. 1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007).  
a counterinsurgency strategy, but that it had not applied its firepower-centric 
doctrine against the guerillas forcefully enough. In geographical terms the Army 
once again turned its attention to Europe and the threat of a Soviet invasion 
after having been bogged down in Vietnam for a decade. Army doctrine could 
be wholeheartedly refocused on the problem of defeating a conventional great 
power Army. This doctrinal evolution culminated in the AirLand Battle concept, 
which was promulgated in the 1982 edition of the Army’s key doctrinal docu-
ment – Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations – and refined in the 1986 issue of 
the same document. Other forms of operations were initially marginalized; the 
Army purged itself of the experiences and capabilities relevant to other conflicts 
than high-intensity, conventional warfare that it had acquired during the Viet-
nam War.
A PARTIAL RENAISSANCE FOR COIN
Despite all this, however, developments at the national security policy level dur-
ing the 1980s once again prompted the armed forces, including the Army, to 
pay more attention to the problems of COIN.20 As part of its concerns regard-
ing Soviet global policy, which was perceived to be increasingly ambitious and 
aggressive, the Reagan Administration took an interest in counterinsurgency. 
In rhetoric reminiscent of the Kennedy Administration, top officials pointed to 
the dangers of Kremlin-backed insurgencies around the world. Despite these 
similarities the Reagan Administration’s counterinsurgency strategy was more 
cautious and differentiated than that of the Kennedy years. While Soviet-spon-
sored insurgency was identified as a global threat, US counterinsurgency strat-
egy focused on Central America and the Caribbean, i.e. areas of more immediate 
American concern, and the risk of escalation was emphasized. The 1987 Na-
tional Security Strategy advocated the indirect application of US military power 
in counterinsurgency efforts and the 1988 issue of the document stated that US 
involvement in what was now termed low-intensity conflict “must be realistic, 
often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict’s out-
come and important U.S. national security interests.”21
20 Unless otherwise specified, the following account of developments at the political 
level and the Army’s COIN doctrine is based on Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: 
Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1995), pp. 8–15; Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. 
Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2002), pp. 3–6 and 12; Thomas K. Adams, The Army After Next. The First 
Post-Industrial Army (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 
pp. 14–15; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 100–103; 
and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation from Vietnam to Iraq, 
pp. 104–105. The concluding characteristic of US COIN doctrine in the 1980s and 
early 1990s is an attempt to synthesize the findings of the literature by utilizing the 
framework underlying this paper.
21 Metz, Counterinsurgency, p. 10 (Metz’s italics).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   16 12-07-07   08:38:54
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 15/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
From Vietnam to the End of the Cold War
The loss in Vietnam was traumatic and humiliating for the US. The Vietnam 
experience had a lasting impact on its national security policies, as well as Army 
doctrine. Although the US was still a global power, its attitude to military inter-
vention abroad became more cautious compared to the first two decades of the 
Cold War. Examples of this approach include the 1969 Nixon Doctrine, which 
placed the primary responsibility for the defense of US allies on these countries 
themselves, and the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, which came in the form of a 
declaration by Secretary of Defense (1981–87) Caspar Weinberger. This doc-
trine stated, among other things, that “the commitment of US forces to combat 
should be a last resort.” For  all practical purposes, the Weinberger Doctrine 
excluded the deployment of US forces for nation-building and other operations 
below the threshold of all-out war.18
The evolution of Army doctrine after Vietnam essentially mirrored this 
outlook. The Vietnam War had a significant impact on the US armed forces 
and the Army was arguably the service most deeply affected.19 At the time of 
withdrawal from Vietnam the Army was severely demoralized and barely func-
tioned as an institution. In order to remedy these afflictions and rebuild itself, 
the Army launched a comprehensive reform program that included an oversight 
of Army doctrine under the auspices of the Training and Doctrine Command 
(TRADOC), established in 1973.
The doctrinal development in the 1970s and 1980s was partly based on a 
specific interpretation of the Vietnam War that acquired the status of conven-
tional Army wisdom. The idea was essentially that the Army’s main mistake in 
Vietnam was not that it paid insufficient attention to nation-building as part of 
18 On the Nixon Doctrine, see, for example, Robert S. Litwak, Détente and the 
Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969–1976 
(Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 191–194. On the Weinberger 
Doctrine, see, for example, Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and 
Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
pp. 46–47; and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From 
Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 131–132. 
19 Unless otherwise specified, the following account of the Army’s overall doctrinal 
development in the 1970s and 1980s is based on Andrew J. Bacevich, The New 
American Militarism. How Americans Are Seduced By War (Oxford, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 34–47; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife, pp. 
205–207;  Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam 
to Iraq, chapters 3–4, especially pp. 104–105; and Corum, “Rethinking US Army 
Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 128–129. As is well known, “maneuver warfare” 
was a central concept in this doctrinal evolution. For a recent critical analysis of 
AirLand Battle doctrine and its understanding of the maneuver warfare concept, 
see Torgeir E. Sæveraas, “Maneuver Warfare: Genghis Khan – Blitzkrieg – AirLand 
Battle?” in Torgeir E. Sæveraas and Kjetil Henriksen, Et militært universalmiddel? 
Amerikansk “Maneuver Warfare” og norsk doktrineutvikling [A Military Panacea? 
American ‘Maneuver Warfare’ and Development of Norwegian Doctrine], Oslo Files 
on Defence and Security, no. 1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007).  
a counterinsurgency strategy, but that it had not applied its firepower-centric 
doctrine against the guerillas forcefully enough. In geographical terms the Army 
once again turned its attention to Europe and the threat of a Soviet invasion 
after having been bogged down in Vietnam for a decade. Army doctrine could 
be wholeheartedly refocused on the problem of defeating a conventional great 
power Army. This doctrinal evolution culminated in the AirLand Battle concept, 
which was promulgated in the 1982 edition of the Army’s key doctrinal docu-
ment – Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations – and refined in the 1986 issue of 
the same document. Other forms of operations were initially marginalized; the 
Army purged itself of the experiences and capabilities relevant to other conflicts 
than high-intensity, conventional warfare that it had acquired during the Viet-
nam War.
A PARTIAL RENAISSANCE FOR COIN
Despite all this, however, developments at the national security policy level dur-
ing the 1980s once again prompted the armed forces, including the Army, to 
pay more attention to the problems of COIN.20 As part of its concerns regard-
ing Soviet global policy, which was perceived to be increasingly ambitious and 
aggressive, the Reagan Administration took an interest in counterinsurgency. 
In rhetoric reminiscent of the Kennedy Administration, top officials pointed to 
the dangers of Kremlin-backed insurgencies around the world. Despite these 
similarities the Reagan Administration’s counterinsurgency strategy was more 
cautious and differentiated than that of the Kennedy years. While Soviet-spon-
sored insurgency was identified as a global threat, US counterinsurgency strat-
egy focused on Central America and the Caribbean, i.e. areas of more immediate 
American concern, and the risk of escalation was emphasized. The 1987 Na-
tional Security Strategy advocated the indirect application of US military power 
in counterinsurgency efforts and the 1988 issue of the document stated that US 
involvement in what was now termed low-intensity conflict “must be realistic, 
often discreet, and founded on a clear relationship between the conflict’s out-
come and important U.S. national security interests.”21
20 Unless otherwise specified, the following account of developments at the political 
level and the Army’s COIN doctrine is based on Steven Metz, Counterinsurgency: 
Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 1995), pp. 8–15; Conrad C. Crane, Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. 
Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, 2002), pp. 3–6 and 12; Thomas K. Adams, The Army After Next. The First 
Post-Industrial Army (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006), 
pp. 14–15; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 100–103; 
and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation from Vietnam to Iraq, 
pp. 104–105. The concluding characteristic of US COIN doctrine in the 1980s and 
early 1990s is an attempt to synthesize the findings of the literature by utilizing the 
framework underlying this paper.
21 Metz, Counterinsurgency, p. 10 (Metz’s italics).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   17 12-07-07   08:38:55
1 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 5/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
Like that of the Kennedy Administration, the Reagan Administration’s 
counterinsurgency strategy assumed that the Soviet Union and other commu-
nist states – exploited indigenous political and economic problems in the Third 
World for the advancement of their interests. In the words of COIN expert Ste-
ven Metz, “the Reagan counterinsurgency strategy blended ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks,’ 
simultaneously promoting democracy, development, dialogue, and defense.”22
These signals from the political level triggered an increased focus on COIN 
on the part of the Army. While it was only mentioned very briefly in the 1982 
and 1986 editions of FM 100-5, COIN and its requirements reemerged as a 
subject of professional debate and the importance of COIN skills was upgraded 
in the training of Army officers. In cooperation with the Air Force, the Army 
founded the Center on Low-Intensity Conflict, which was devoted to studying 
and analyzing this neglected topic.
Just as the Kennedy Administration’s COIN strategy had been tested in 
Vietnam, the Reagan Administration’s strategy was implemented in El Salvador 
where the FMLN guerillas, backed by the Soviet bloc, were struggling to over-
throw a right-wing dictatorship. The US engaged in the conflict by sending ci-
vilian and military advisors to the Salvadorian government; an Army Special 
Forces training team arrived in 1981. The Army was hardly enthusiastic about 
US involvement in El Salvador, but it had absorbed a set of lessons from Vietnam 
and was anxious to avoid the perceived mistakes of that conflict. The Army’s 
strategy was thus primarily designed to counter a “people’s war” type insur-
gency, similar to the one practiced by the South Vietnamese insurgents during 
the previous decades. The goal of creating popular support for the government 
was thus of primary importance in the Army’s strategy, and military concerns 
were subordinate to this overriding goal. The US military was to play a predomi-
nantly advisory role. The Salvadorian military and police’s COIN strategy was 
marked by indiscriminate violence, and trying to change this approach became a 
major goal of US efforts. Although human rights abuses continued, El Salvador 
was by the early 1990s, in Steven Metz’s words, “at least a qualified success.”23 
The quality and efficiency of the El Salvador armed forces had improved, El 
Salvador had become a democracy – albeit a fragile one – and popular support 
for FMLN had decreased significantly.
The lessons from Vietnam and the new experiences from El Salvador were 
distilled into Army doctrine over the 1980s as the 1981 Field Manual 100-20, 
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict was being revised; a new edition 
was issued in 1990. The doctrine stressed the need for legitimacy and assumed 
that the people would support the government or the insurgents depending on 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 14.
which side could offer them the best material conditions. US participation in 
COIN operations presupposed that the host government applied an internal de-
fense and development (IDAD) strategy aimed at ameliorating the people’s po-
litical, economic, and social grievances. This emphasis in FM 100-20 on the po-
litical character of insurgencies did not mean, however, that Army efforts should 
be directly integrated with those of civilian US and host government agencies 
attempting to address popular grievances. The Army’s primary function was to 
advise the indigenous military with the purpose of developing or boosting inter-
nal military COIN capabilities. Like the 1987 National Security Strategy, FM 
100-20 envisioned US forces in a primarily assisting role, but it did not categori-
cally rule out their direct participation in combat. This theme recurred in tactical 
level doctrine but, echoing the Weinberger Doctrine, the doctrine stated that US 
forces would only participate in combat operations as a last resort.
Army low intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine of the early 1990s expressed a 
somewhat contradictory approach to the use of force. Consistent with the em-
phasis on legitimacy it accepted that political considerations influence military 
activities. But they were to do so in a limited sense, reflecting the aloof attitude 
taken to direct integration of civil-military COIN efforts. Civilian affairs and 
psychological affairs were not an integrated part of Army COIN operations. In-
stead, political constraints should take the form of restrictions applied to purely 
military operations. For example, engagement criteria and the size and type of 
forces used could be designed to comply with political imperatives. Furthermore, 
the doctrine alternated between advocating a minimum use of force, believed to 
further political legitimacy, and advocating the use of decisive force, which was 
prevalent in US military doctrine in general.24
COIN DOCTRINE AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR
In sum, then, it could be argued that US Army COIN doctrine at the end of the 
Cold War encompassed elements of the small war approach while simultane-
ously reflecting the big war paradigm which was ingrained in Army doctrine as 
a whole. During the Vietnam years the Army had rejected or ignored the view of 
insurgency as an essentially political struggle and the concomitant notion that 
defeating it required a political, economic, and social strategy. But these ideas 
were now accepted as the basis of Army involvement in El Salvador and were 
subsequently codified in doctrine. On the other hand the Army was to play a 
rather narrowly defined military role; the direct implementation of non-military 
measures was left to other actors. Furthermore, direct Army involvement in 
24 See Thomas K. Adams, “LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz),” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990, pp. 266–275; Thomas R. Mockaitis, “A New Era of 
COIN,” The RUSI Journal, No. 136 (September 1991), pp. 77–78; and Lock-Pullan, 
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation from Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 105 and 156.
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where the FMLN guerillas, backed by the Soviet bloc, were struggling to over-
throw a right-wing dictatorship. The US engaged in the conflict by sending ci-
vilian and military advisors to the Salvadorian government; an Army Special 
Forces training team arrived in 1981. The Army was hardly enthusiastic about 
US involvement in El Salvador, but it had absorbed a set of lessons from Vietnam 
and was anxious to avoid the perceived mistakes of that conflict. The Army’s 
strategy was thus primarily designed to counter a “people’s war” type insur-
gency, similar to the one practiced by the South Vietnamese insurgents during 
the previous decades. The goal of creating popular support for the government 
was thus of primary importance in the Army’s strategy, and military concerns 
were subordinate to this overriding goal. The US military was to play a predomi-
nantly advisory role. The Salvadorian military and police’s COIN strategy was 
marked by indiscriminate violence, and trying to change this approach became a 
major goal of US efforts. Although human rights abuses continued, El Salvador 
was by the early 1990s, in Steven Metz’s words, “at least a qualified success.”23 
The quality and efficiency of the El Salvador armed forces had improved, El 
Salvador had become a democracy – albeit a fragile one – and popular support 
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The lessons from Vietnam and the new experiences from El Salvador were 
distilled into Army doctrine over the 1980s as the 1981 Field Manual 100-20, 
Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict was being revised; a new edition 
was issued in 1990. The doctrine stressed the need for legitimacy and assumed 
that the people would support the government or the insurgents depending on 
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 14.
which side could offer them the best material conditions. US participation in 
COIN operations presupposed that the host government applied an internal de-
fense and development (IDAD) strategy aimed at ameliorating the people’s po-
litical, economic, and social grievances. This emphasis in FM 100-20 on the po-
litical character of insurgencies did not mean, however, that Army efforts should 
be directly integrated with those of civilian US and host government agencies 
attempting to address popular grievances. The Army’s primary function was to 
advise the indigenous military with the purpose of developing or boosting inter-
nal military COIN capabilities. Like the 1987 National Security Strategy, FM 
100-20 envisioned US forces in a primarily assisting role, but it did not categori-
cally rule out their direct participation in combat. This theme recurred in tactical 
level doctrine but, echoing the Weinberger Doctrine, the doctrine stated that US 
forces would only participate in combat operations as a last resort.
Army low intensity conflict (LIC) doctrine of the early 1990s expressed a 
somewhat contradictory approach to the use of force. Consistent with the em-
phasis on legitimacy it accepted that political considerations influence military 
activities. But they were to do so in a limited sense, reflecting the aloof attitude 
taken to direct integration of civil-military COIN efforts. Civilian affairs and 
psychological affairs were not an integrated part of Army COIN operations. In-
stead, political constraints should take the form of restrictions applied to purely 
military operations. For example, engagement criteria and the size and type of 
forces used could be designed to comply with political imperatives. Furthermore, 
the doctrine alternated between advocating a minimum use of force, believed to 
further political legitimacy, and advocating the use of decisive force, which was 
prevalent in US military doctrine in general.24
COIN DOCTRINE AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR
In sum, then, it could be argued that US Army COIN doctrine at the end of the 
Cold War encompassed elements of the small war approach while simultane-
ously reflecting the big war paradigm which was ingrained in Army doctrine as 
a whole. During the Vietnam years the Army had rejected or ignored the view of 
insurgency as an essentially political struggle and the concomitant notion that 
defeating it required a political, economic, and social strategy. But these ideas 
were now accepted as the basis of Army involvement in El Salvador and were 
subsequently codified in doctrine. On the other hand the Army was to play a 
rather narrowly defined military role; the direct implementation of non-military 
measures was left to other actors. Furthermore, direct Army involvement in 
24 See Thomas K. Adams, “LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz),” Small Wars and 
Insurgencies, vol. 1, no. 3, 1990, pp. 266–275; Thomas R. Mockaitis, “A New Era of 
COIN,” The RUSI Journal, No. 136 (September 1991), pp. 77–78; and Lock-Pullan, 
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation from Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 105 and 156.
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combat as part of COIN efforts – a type of conflict that did not fit into the big 
war paradigm – was to be a last resort. A corresponding tension between small 
war and big war approaches to COIN could also be found in strategy at the na-
tional level. Regarding the relative salience of COIN in Army doctrine, it should 
be remembered that while the publishing of LIC manuals in 1981 and 1990 rep-
resented a change when compared to the immediate post-Vietnam years, COIN 
was by no means a dominating theme in Army doctrine as a whole.
The revised version of FM 100-20 was published at a time when the Soviet 
Union was crumbling and the international landscape was being remolded. In 
this international environment the US, leading a UN-sanctioned multilateral co-
alition, evicted Iraqi forces from occupied Kuwait in the 1990–91 Gulf War. The 
operation was widely seen as a model application of the Weinberger Doctrine. 
From an Army perspective the spectacular American victory was perceived as a 
vindication of the reforms that had been implemented since the 1970s, including 
the refinement of Army doctrine to defeat a conventionally organized opponent 
in a high-intensity conflict of short duration. The corresponding downgrading of 
nation-building, counterinsurgency, etc. to a peripheral role could also be justi-
fied with reference to the first Gulf War, as it could be argued that this was the 
kind of conflict for which the Army needed to be prepared.25
“The Strategic Pause,” 99–200
In terms of US national security policies the 1991–2001 period can be character-
ized as an interwar phase between the victory in the Cold War and the intensified 
confrontation with international terrorism beginning on 11 September 2001. 
Despite important differences there were also considerable similarities between 
the respective approaches to national security issues of the George H.W. Bush 
Administration (1989–93) and the William J. Clinton Administration (1993–
2001). It was clear that the end of the Cold War had a tremendous impact on 
the global security environment, and both administrations grappled with the 
implications for US national security. A common policy theme was that the fall 
of the Soviet Union opened up for the possibility of a worldwide expansion 
of democracy, free-market economics, and global economic integration. It was 
argued that the US had an important stake in encouraging and supporting these 
25 See, for example, Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 46–47; Boot, The Savage Wars of 
Peace, pp. 320–322; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From 
Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 140–145; and Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency 
Doctrine,” p. 129.
trends. Doing so was not only consistent with American values and the country’s 
internationalist tradition; it was also a means of promoting US security.26
Both administrations argued that the global Soviet threat had been re-
placed by a number of lesser threats, including smaller powers who might op-
pose US interests on a regional level. Notable among these regional adversaries 
were Iraq, Iran, and North Korea – long-standing sources of American concern. 
The emergence of a peer competitor – a nation-state that could challenge the US 
globally – was considered a future possibility. A revitalized Russia and, increas-
ingly, a rising China were seen as candidates for this role. In addition to these 
threats from nation-states there was a host of other post-Cold War dangers, 
including organized crime, terrorism, and ethnic conflict. None of these threats 
was considered imminent however, and the Clinton Administration asserted 
that, given the historically benign international environment, the US was in a 
“strategic pause.”27
The Clinton Department of Defense directed the armed forces to use the 
strategic pause to adapt to the envisioned security environment while maintain-
ing their capabilities for dealing with current threats, focusing on the Persian 
Gulf region and the Korean Peninsula. The adaptation of US forces to future 
needs went by the name of “military transformation” and one of its declared 
goals was to increase deployability and capabilities for expeditionary opera-
tions. Another key feature of military transformation was the attempt to ex-
ploit the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), i.e. utilizing America’s 
technological superiority to maintain and increase its military advantages over 
potential adversaries. The transformation was primarily aimed at honing the US 
edge in conventional, high-intensity conflicts against other nation-states.
At the level of national security policy the big war paradigm was challenged 
by the Clinton Administration’s approach to the use of force. The Weinberger 
Doctrine was still a powerful factor in issues involving the possible use of military 
force and it was followed in 1990 by the Powell Doctrine, which shared many 
26 On the 1991–2001 years as an “interwar era,” see, for example, D. Robert Worley, 
Shaping U.S. Military Forces. Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World 
(Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 70. The 
description of the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administrations’ national 
security policies is based on Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Touchstone/
Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapters 1 and 31; Bacevich, American Empire, chapters 3–
4 (especially p. 87, 88, 90, and 114–115); and John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, 
and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 
77–80.
27 The present paragraph and the next are based on Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 
98–100; Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 26–33 and chapters 3–5 (especially pp. 
35–36, 42–43, 46–50, and 63–65); Kagan, Finding the Target, chapter 4, pp. 176–184, 
and chapter 6 (especially pp. 239ff); Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army 
Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 159–165 and 175–176; and Worley, Shaping 
U.S. Military Forces, pp. 42–50 and 91–93.
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combat as part of COIN efforts – a type of conflict that did not fit into the big 
war paradigm – was to be a last resort. A corresponding tension between small 
war and big war approaches to COIN could also be found in strategy at the na-
tional level. Regarding the relative salience of COIN in Army doctrine, it should 
be remembered that while the publishing of LIC manuals in 1981 and 1990 rep-
resented a change when compared to the immediate post-Vietnam years, COIN 
was by no means a dominating theme in Army doctrine as a whole.
The revised version of FM 100-20 was published at a time when the Soviet 
Union was crumbling and the international landscape was being remolded. In 
this international environment the US, leading a UN-sanctioned multilateral co-
alition, evicted Iraqi forces from occupied Kuwait in the 1990–91 Gulf War. The 
operation was widely seen as a model application of the Weinberger Doctrine. 
From an Army perspective the spectacular American victory was perceived as a 
vindication of the reforms that had been implemented since the 1970s, including 
the refinement of Army doctrine to defeat a conventionally organized opponent 
in a high-intensity conflict of short duration. The corresponding downgrading of 
nation-building, counterinsurgency, etc. to a peripheral role could also be justi-
fied with reference to the first Gulf War, as it could be argued that this was the 
kind of conflict for which the Army needed to be prepared.25
“The Strategic Pause,” 99–200
In terms of US national security policies the 1991–2001 period can be character-
ized as an interwar phase between the victory in the Cold War and the intensified 
confrontation with international terrorism beginning on 11 September 2001. 
Despite important differences there were also considerable similarities between 
the respective approaches to national security issues of the George H.W. Bush 
Administration (1989–93) and the William J. Clinton Administration (1993–
2001). It was clear that the end of the Cold War had a tremendous impact on 
the global security environment, and both administrations grappled with the 
implications for US national security. A common policy theme was that the fall 
of the Soviet Union opened up for the possibility of a worldwide expansion 
of democracy, free-market economics, and global economic integration. It was 
argued that the US had an important stake in encouraging and supporting these 
25 See, for example, Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 46–47; Boot, The Savage Wars of 
Peace, pp. 320–322; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From 
Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 140–145; and Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency 
Doctrine,” p. 129.
trends. Doing so was not only consistent with American values and the country’s 
internationalist tradition; it was also a means of promoting US security.26
Both administrations argued that the global Soviet threat had been re-
placed by a number of lesser threats, including smaller powers who might op-
pose US interests on a regional level. Notable among these regional adversaries 
were Iraq, Iran, and North Korea – long-standing sources of American concern. 
The emergence of a peer competitor – a nation-state that could challenge the US 
globally – was considered a future possibility. A revitalized Russia and, increas-
ingly, a rising China were seen as candidates for this role. In addition to these 
threats from nation-states there was a host of other post-Cold War dangers, 
including organized crime, terrorism, and ethnic conflict. None of these threats 
was considered imminent however, and the Clinton Administration asserted 
that, given the historically benign international environment, the US was in a 
“strategic pause.”27
The Clinton Department of Defense directed the armed forces to use the 
strategic pause to adapt to the envisioned security environment while maintain-
ing their capabilities for dealing with current threats, focusing on the Persian 
Gulf region and the Korean Peninsula. The adaptation of US forces to future 
needs went by the name of “military transformation” and one of its declared 
goals was to increase deployability and capabilities for expeditionary opera-
tions. Another key feature of military transformation was the attempt to ex-
ploit the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA), i.e. utilizing America’s 
technological superiority to maintain and increase its military advantages over 
potential adversaries. The transformation was primarily aimed at honing the US 
edge in conventional, high-intensity conflicts against other nation-states.
At the level of national security policy the big war paradigm was challenged 
by the Clinton Administration’s approach to the use of force. The Weinberger 
Doctrine was still a powerful factor in issues involving the possible use of military 
force and it was followed in 1990 by the Powell Doctrine, which shared many 
26 On the 1991–2001 years as an “interwar era,” see, for example, D. Robert Worley, 
Shaping U.S. Military Forces. Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War World 
(Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 70. The 
description of the George H.W. Bush and the Clinton administrations’ national 
security policies is based on Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, NY: Touchstone/
Simon & Schuster, 1994), chapters 1 and 31; Bacevich, American Empire, chapters 3–
4 (especially p. 87, 88, 90, and 114–115); and John Lewis Gaddis, Surprise, Security, 
and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 
77–80.
27 The present paragraph and the next are based on Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 
98–100; Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 26–33 and chapters 3–5 (especially pp. 
35–36, 42–43, 46–50, and 63–65); Kagan, Finding the Target, chapter 4, pp. 176–184, 
and chapter 6 (especially pp. 239ff); Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army 
Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 159–165 and 175–176; and Worley, Shaping 
U.S. Military Forces, pp. 42–50 and 91–93.
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of the Weinberger Doctrine’s characteristics. The Powell doctrine was coined by 
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989–93), who had 
also been Secretary Weinberger’s Military Assistant and in that capacity coau-
thored the Weinberger Doctrine. The use of decisive force, a basic tenet of the 
Powell Doctrine, was repeated in the 1992 National Military Strategy. In con-
trast to the Weinberger-Powell framework, the Clinton Administration declared 
its willingness to use force to promote interests that were not considered vital to 
US national security and emphasized that the military instrument must be rel-
evant to humanitarian interventions and other operations falling outside the big 
war paradigm. This approach was implemented as the Clinton Administration 
repeatedly utilized airpower for limited purposes and committed ground forces 
to peace operations and humanitarian interventions.28
A DImINISHING ROLE FOR COIN – AGAIN
COIN as such was not at the heart of this tension between the big war paradigm 
and the Clinton Administration’s use of force doctrine and policies: “Ameri-
can involvement in internal wars took the form of multinational peacekeeping 
rather than counterinsurgency.” During the latter half of the 1990s documents 
such as the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) discussed the problem 
of asymmetric challenges, which had some relevance to the problems of insur-
gency. It was assumed that America’s enemies could avoid confronting the US 
in conventional war, in which the US was clearly superior, and would prefer 
instead to use methods which could offset this imbalance. Asymmetric methods 
included terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. But the recogni-
tion of asymmetric challenges did not significantly affect the course of military 
transformation.29
Similarly, COIN was not a prominent theme in Army transformation or 
doctrine. The big war paradigm was still strong, and to the extent that it was 
challenged it was not by demands pertaining specifically to COIN. In response 
to pressure from the political level, and as a result of a re-evaluation of the 
strategic environment on the part of the Army itself, operations falling outside 
the big war paradigm became incrementally more prominent in Army doctrine 
28 See Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 92–93, 102–112, chapter 6, and p. 167; Boot, 
The Savage Wars of Peace, pp. 322–327; Jeffrey Record, Making War, Thinking 
History. Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002), pp. 31–32, chapter 8, and p. 115; 
Bacevich, The New American Militarism, pp. 51–52, 57–58, and 60; Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 28–30, 118, and 122; Kagan, 
Finding the Target, pp. 99 and chapter 5, especially pp. 180, 184–185, and 194–195; 
and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq, 
pp. 133, 147–149, 169–171, and 173–175.
29 Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 12–14; quotation on p. 12. See also Corum, 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 129–131.
over the course of the 1990s. A milestone in this process was the publication 
in 1993 of a new edition of the Army’s key doctrinal publication, FM 100-5, 
Operations, which differentiated between war and operations other than war 
(OOTW). The latter was a new doctrinal category which replaced LIC. OOTW 
was divided into different subcategories: evacuation operations, arms control, 
support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, peace 
enforcement, show of force, support to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 
and attacks and raids.30
Thus, while counterinsurgency, together with counterdrug operations, had 
been the focus of LIC doctrine, it was now subsumed within the wider OOTW 
category together with an array of other types of operations. The 1993 issue of 
FM 100-5 dealt very briefly with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, as did 
the 2001 edition of the same document, FM 3-0.31
The substance of Army COIN doctrine remained relatively unchanged dur-
ing the 1991–2001 period. The 1992 FM 7-98, Operations in a Low-Intensity 
Conflict, which remained in force until 2003, focused on the Maoist “people’s 
war” type of insurgency and prescribed the application of AirLand Battle prin-
ciples in LIC. The 1993 issue of FM 100-5 cited the El Salvador COIN model 
and emphasized the US Army’s role in supporting the Salvadorian government 
forces. Other doctrinal publications repeated the perceived utility of providing 
the people in a contested country with material goods, thus building popular le-
gitimacy and undermining the insurgents. The 2001 FM 3-0 referred to Vietnam 
in a way that clearly expressed reluctance to, if not outright rejection of, Army 
involvement in combat for COIN purposes.32
30 On the overall direction of Army transformation in the 1990s, see, for example, 
Adams, The Army After Next, chapters 3–4. On the Army’s development of doctrine 
for operations outside the big war paradigm in the 1991–2001 period, see James W. 
Reed, “Should Deterrence Fail. War Termination in Campaign Planning,” Parameters, 
vol. XXIII, no. 2 (1993) [Online 22 June 2007]; James T. Quinlivan, “Force 
Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, vol. XXV, no. 4 (1995) [online 
22 June 2007]; David Fastabend, ”The Categorization of Conflict,” Parameters, 
vol. XXVII, no. 2 (1997) [online 22 June 2007]; John L. Romjue, American Army 
Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 1997), 
pp. 47, 52, 53, 115, 120, 126–127, and 151; Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss, pp. 
132, 135, 139–144, 215–224, and 235; Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 26–27 and 
35–36; Blackwell, “Professionalism and Army Doctrine,” pp. 335 and 339; Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, footnote 43, p.171; Kagan, Finding 
the Target, pp. 160, 167–168, and 205; and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and 
Army Innovation from Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 150–156, 158, and 163.
31 Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, pp. 12–14. The denomination 3-0, rather than the 
traditional 100-5, reflected an administrative change in the categorization of Army 
doctrinal publications.
32 Metz, Counterinsurgency, p. 22; and Crane, Avoiding Vietnam, pp. 13–14.
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also been Secretary Weinberger’s Military Assistant and in that capacity coau-
thored the Weinberger Doctrine. The use of decisive force, a basic tenet of the 
Powell Doctrine, was repeated in the 1992 National Military Strategy. In con-
trast to the Weinberger-Powell framework, the Clinton Administration declared 
its willingness to use force to promote interests that were not considered vital to 
US national security and emphasized that the military instrument must be rel-
evant to humanitarian interventions and other operations falling outside the big 
war paradigm. This approach was implemented as the Clinton Administration 
repeatedly utilized airpower for limited purposes and committed ground forces 
to peace operations and humanitarian interventions.28
A DImINISHING ROLE FOR COIN – AGAIN
COIN as such was not at the heart of this tension between the big war paradigm 
and the Clinton Administration’s use of force doctrine and policies: “Ameri-
can involvement in internal wars took the form of multinational peacekeeping 
rather than counterinsurgency.” During the latter half of the 1990s documents 
such as the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) discussed the problem 
of asymmetric challenges, which had some relevance to the problems of insur-
gency. It was assumed that America’s enemies could avoid confronting the US 
in conventional war, in which the US was clearly superior, and would prefer 
instead to use methods which could offset this imbalance. Asymmetric methods 
included terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. But the recogni-
tion of asymmetric challenges did not significantly affect the course of military 
transformation.29
Similarly, COIN was not a prominent theme in Army transformation or 
doctrine. The big war paradigm was still strong, and to the extent that it was 
challenged it was not by demands pertaining specifically to COIN. In response 
to pressure from the political level, and as a result of a re-evaluation of the 
strategic environment on the part of the Army itself, operations falling outside 
the big war paradigm became incrementally more prominent in Army doctrine 
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(OOTW). The latter was a new doctrinal category which replaced LIC. OOTW 
was divided into different subcategories: evacuation operations, arms control, 
support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
security assistance, nation assistance, support to counterdrug operations, peace 
enforcement, show of force, support to insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, 
and attacks and raids.30
Thus, while counterinsurgency, together with counterdrug operations, had 
been the focus of LIC doctrine, it was now subsumed within the wider OOTW 
category together with an array of other types of operations. The 1993 issue of 
FM 100-5 dealt very briefly with insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, as did 
the 2001 edition of the same document, FM 3-0.31
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Another notable feature of FM 3-0 was that it used the term stability op-
erations, referring to efforts at maintaining or establishing basic political order 
and protecting the physical security of a population. This concept had been ab-
sent from Army doctrine since the end of the 1960s counterinsurgency era but 
now resurfaced.33 The reintroduction of the term stability operations did not, 
however, amount to a comprehensive doctrinal interest in COIN.
It has been argued that Army COIN doctrine, crafted to defeat insurgencies 
similar to those in Vietnam and El Salvador, was inadequate for dealing with in-
terventions in the post-Cold War environment, such as the one in Somalia. Here, 
President Clinton had inherited from the George H.W. Bush Administration a 
commitment to a UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operation. However, the 
character of the operation soon changed and US forces – including Army Rang-
ers – became involved in heavy fighting in Mogadishu, during which they suf-
fered a number of casualties. This prompted the withdrawal of US forces from 
Somalia, which was completed in 1994. The situation in Somalia can be char-
acterized as an insurgency whose characteristics differed from those of the Cold 
War. The US Army embarked on the Somalian intervention without relevant 
specific doctrinal guidance, since the existing LIC manuals dealt with a rather 
limited set of operations, i.e. Cold War-type counterinsurgency and counterdrug 
operations. The requirements of interventions such as that in Somalia were quite 
different and the doctrinal void arguably contributed to the disastrous outcome 
of that operation.34
COIN DOCTRINE AT THE END OF “THE STRATEGIC PAUSE”
To sum up the doctrinal development of the 1990s, it can be said that the big 
war paradigm still dominated Army doctrine, and although “operations other 
than war” became more salient  COIN was hardly considered more central than 
it had been during the latter part of the Cold War. Since the substance of Army 
COIN doctrine from the 1980s and 1990s did not change radically during the 
1991–2001 period, doctrine still contained a mix of elements of the big war and 
small war approaches, including a general reluctance to being drawn into COIN 
operations, especially outside a rather narrowly defined military advisory role.
COIN had been a rather marginal concern of the Clinton Administration 
despite its generally interventionist policies. The prospects of COIN becoming 
33 See Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations”; Fastabend, ”The 
Categorization of Conflict”; and Blackwell, “Professionalism and Army Doctrine,” p. 
335.
34 Metz, Counterinsurgency, pp. 18 and 22; Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss, chapter 
5 (especially p. 165f); and Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation 
from Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 151–158. See also Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 10–11 
for a critical analysis of the El Salvador model which was the basis of much of  COIN 
doctrine in the 1990s.
a centerpiece of US policy did not seem to be greater under Clinton’s succes-
sor. In his 2000 election campaign the Republican candidate George W. Bush 
criticized the Clinton Administration’s approach to military action. In one of his 
speeches Bush cited the lessons of Vietnam and said that “When America uses 
force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory 
must be overwhelming.” This was a recurring theme in the campaign: if Bush 
were elected president he would return to the ostensibly more judicious use of 
military force practiced by his father’s administration. By implication this would 
entail the reaffirmation of the Weinberger-Powell framework. Bush argued that 
the armed forces should be geared toward deterring and winning wars and dis-
missed operations outside the big war paradigm.35
“The Global War on Terror”
The period after 9/11 has witnessed the most dramatic changes in US approach-
es to COIN since Vietnam, both at the national level and in Army doctrine. At 
the national level three sub-phases can be distinguished. First, prior to 9/11 the 
Bush Administration stuck to its verbal rejection of using the military for op-
erations that did not fit into the big war paradigm, but it did not act upon this 
rhetoric in any discernable way. Thereafter, the administration’s grand strategy 
was activated in the wake of 9/11 and the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq 
were undertaken. Even during the first year or so of the Iraq conflict COIN was 
still a peripheral concern. Finally, beginning in 2004, the importance of stabil-
ity and reconstruction operations was elevated and in 2006 COIN was also 
formally recognized as an integral component of the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT).
The changes in Army doctrine immediately after 9/11 were not as dramatic 
as those at the national security policy level; the years 2001–03 saw a modest 
continuation of the OOTW/stability operations doctrinal trend that had began 
in the 1990s. A new phase began with the 2004 publication of a new COIN 
manual, FMI 3-07.22, which marked a rising importance of COIN in Army 
doctrine. This trend continued with the issuing of FM 3-24 in 2006. Given the 
rather substantial differences between these two documents in terms of content, 
one could argue that FM 3-24 marks the beginning of yet another phase in the 
evolution of Army COIN doctrine. In the following, the lines of development 
outlined above are accounted for in greater detail, beginning with the national 
security policy level.
35 See Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 203–204 and 207–209; Boot, The Savage Wars of 
Peace, p. 319; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 264–267; Worley, Shaping U.S. Military 
Forces, p. 42; Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 14–15; and Corum, “Rethinking US 
Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 129–130 (quotation on Vietnam from Boot).
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a centerpiece of US policy did not seem to be greater under Clinton’s succes-
sor. In his 2000 election campaign the Republican candidate George W. Bush 
criticized the Clinton Administration’s approach to military action. In one of his 
speeches Bush cited the lessons of Vietnam and said that “When America uses 
force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory 
must be overwhelming.” This was a recurring theme in the campaign: if Bush 
were elected president he would return to the ostensibly more judicious use of 
military force practiced by his father’s administration. By implication this would 
entail the reaffirmation of the Weinberger-Powell framework. Bush argued that 
the armed forces should be geared toward deterring and winning wars and dis-
missed operations outside the big war paradigm.35
“The Global War on Terror”
The period after 9/11 has witnessed the most dramatic changes in US approach-
es to COIN since Vietnam, both at the national level and in Army doctrine. At 
the national level three sub-phases can be distinguished. First, prior to 9/11 the 
Bush Administration stuck to its verbal rejection of using the military for op-
erations that did not fit into the big war paradigm, but it did not act upon this 
rhetoric in any discernable way. Thereafter, the administration’s grand strategy 
was activated in the wake of 9/11 and the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq 
were undertaken. Even during the first year or so of the Iraq conflict COIN was 
still a peripheral concern. Finally, beginning in 2004, the importance of stabil-
ity and reconstruction operations was elevated and in 2006 COIN was also 
formally recognized as an integral component of the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT).
The changes in Army doctrine immediately after 9/11 were not as dramatic 
as those at the national security policy level; the years 2001–03 saw a modest 
continuation of the OOTW/stability operations doctrinal trend that had began 
in the 1990s. A new phase began with the 2004 publication of a new COIN 
manual, FMI 3-07.22, which marked a rising importance of COIN in Army 
doctrine. This trend continued with the issuing of FM 3-24 in 2006. Given the 
rather substantial differences between these two documents in terms of content, 
one could argue that FM 3-24 marks the beginning of yet another phase in the 
evolution of Army COIN doctrine. In the following, the lines of development 
outlined above are accounted for in greater detail, beginning with the national 
security policy level.
35 See Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 203–204 and 207–209; Boot, The Savage Wars of 
Peace, p. 319; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 264–267; Worley, Shaping U.S. Military 
Forces, p. 42; Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 14–15; and Corum, “Rethinking US 
Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 129–130 (quotation on Vietnam from Boot).
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During its first eight months the national security policies of the George W. 
Bush Administration, like those of its predecessor, were based on the notion of 
a strategic pause that would give America time to transform its military forces 
for future needs. Initially those needs were defined in much the same terms that 
Bush had outlined during his campaign, i.e. continuing and accelerating the 
technology-based transformational process. This was the mandate of Secretary 
of Defense (2001–06) Donald H. Rumsfeld, who vigorously took on the task. 
When it came to the actual use of force prior to 9/11 there was no substantial re-
vision of the Clinton Administration’s policies despite Bush’s campaign rhetoric. 
The US did not withdraw from its peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans, 
and Saddam Hussein was still contained by sanctions and air power.36
But in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 the Bush Ad-
ministration revised its approach to the use of force. The vision of a “humble” 
foreign policy and a highly selective use of military force was replaced by the 
very different grand strategy captured in the Bush Doctrine. The administra-
tion declared that America was now waging a “Global War on Terrorism” and 
argued that the US faced a grave threat from “shadowy terrorist networks” and 
“rogue states.” According to the doctrine these enemies were determined to ac-
quire weapons of mass destruction and use them against the US. Since they were 
not susceptible to deterrence their plans must be actively thwarted, if necessary 
by the anticipatory use of military power. When US forces conducted such at-
tacks they would also overthrow the hostile regime so as to make permanent the 
gains for American security; this was termed “regime change.” In his 2002 State 
of the Union speech President Bush identified the three “rogue states” claimed 
to pose the greatest threat to US national security: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, 
together forming an “Axis of Evil.”37
The Bush Doctrine thus symbolized a substantial reorientation of the ad-
ministration’s grand strategy, but at least in the short term it did not have a cor-
36 On the Bush administration’s acceptance of the “strategic pause” concept, see Adams, 
The Army After Next, p. 105. On the Bush administration’s rhetoric and policy 
regarding transformation, see Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 95–100 and 102–
104; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 265–281; Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy 
and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 176–177; and Worley, Shaping U.S. 
Military Forces, pp. 49–50. On the Bush administration’s use of force before 9/11, see 
Bacevich, American Empire, pp. 207–209.
37 On the key tenets of the Bush Doctrine, see, for example, Bacevich, American Empire, 
pp. 227–233; Elaine M. Bunn, “Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What 
Effect?,” Strategic Forum, no. 200, July 2003; Lawrence Freedman, “Prevention, 
Not Preemption,” in Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. 
Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, eds. Alexander J. T. Lennon and Camille 
Eiss, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); and Gaddis, Surprise, Security, and the 
American Experience, pp. 83–87, 90–92, and 100.
responding effect on its overall defense transformation policies.38 A few weeks 
after 9/11 Rumsfeld’s Pentagon released the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) which was to guide US defense policy. Its prescriptions for the develop-
ment of the armed forces did not differ significantly from previous statements 
by the Bush Administration: the goal was still to exploit the RMA by enhancing 
US capabilities for swift, decisive operations against a conventionally-organized 
enemy. Reflecting the emerging Bush Doctrine, QDR 2001 identified regime 
change as a military mission, but it scarcely addressed the potential implications 
in terms of stability and reconstruction operations once a hostile regime had 
been removed.
Afghanistan and Iraq became the first battlefields in the GWOT and a test-
ing ground for the Bush Administration’s concept of regime change. The admin-
istration held both operations up as models for future warfare: the US had rap-
idly toppled the Taliban and Saddam Hussein by using small, agile, networked 
ground forces operating in synergy with air power. However, overthrowing 
these hostile regimes turned out to be the least difficult part, and problems of a 
different nature soon ensued as US forces faced a protracted state of turmoil in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the Bush Administration had severely un-
derestimated the difficulties associated with the transition from a power vacuum 
to stability, not to mention the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
In the face of continuing difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq the Bush Ad-
ministration gradually changed its transformation policies and its overall ap-
proach to the use of military power, beginning in 2003. A number of Department 
of Defense directives issued in 2004–05 decreed that stability and reconstruction 
operations were henceforth to be assigned the same priority as major combat 
operations in the activities of the armed forces. The 2004 National Military 
Strategy, the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the 2006 National Security Strat-
egy, and the 2006 QDR increasingly addressed post-conflict operations and ir-
regular warfare. As part of its vision for the development of joint ground forces 
the QDR stated: “Future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, 
including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in 
high-intensity combat.” This change of policy at the national level was accom-
38 On these policies up to and including the initial post-conflict phase in Iraq, see, for 
example, Stephen D. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for 
Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 2002); Jeffrey Record, Dark Victory. America’s Second War Against 
Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), pp. 97–105 and 119; Adams, The 
Army After Next, chapters 6–8, especially pp. 109–110, 112, 117, 121–122, 125–126, 
134–140, 149f, 158f, 177, and 179; Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 283 and 285–286, 
chapter 8 (especially pp. 297–299, 305ff, and 310–322), and chapter 9; Lock-Pullan, 
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq, pp. 178–184; 
Worley, Shaping U.S. Military Forces, pp. 49–50; and Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 
15–17.
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for future needs. Initially those needs were defined in much the same terms that 
Bush had outlined during his campaign, i.e. continuing and accelerating the 
technology-based transformational process. This was the mandate of Secretary 
of Defense (2001–06) Donald H. Rumsfeld, who vigorously took on the task. 
When it came to the actual use of force prior to 9/11 there was no substantial re-
vision of the Clinton Administration’s policies despite Bush’s campaign rhetoric. 
The US did not withdraw from its peacekeeping commitments in the Balkans, 
and Saddam Hussein was still contained by sanctions and air power.36
But in the wake of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 the Bush Ad-
ministration revised its approach to the use of force. The vision of a “humble” 
foreign policy and a highly selective use of military force was replaced by the 
very different grand strategy captured in the Bush Doctrine. The administra-
tion declared that America was now waging a “Global War on Terrorism” and 
argued that the US faced a grave threat from “shadowy terrorist networks” and 
“rogue states.” According to the doctrine these enemies were determined to ac-
quire weapons of mass destruction and use them against the US. Since they were 
not susceptible to deterrence their plans must be actively thwarted, if necessary 
by the anticipatory use of military power. When US forces conducted such at-
tacks they would also overthrow the hostile regime so as to make permanent the 
gains for American security; this was termed “regime change.” In his 2002 State 
of the Union speech President Bush identified the three “rogue states” claimed 
to pose the greatest threat to US national security: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, 
together forming an “Axis of Evil.”37
The Bush Doctrine thus symbolized a substantial reorientation of the ad-
ministration’s grand strategy, but at least in the short term it did not have a cor-
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responding effect on its overall defense transformation policies.38 A few weeks 
after 9/11 Rumsfeld’s Pentagon released the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) which was to guide US defense policy. Its prescriptions for the develop-
ment of the armed forces did not differ significantly from previous statements 
by the Bush Administration: the goal was still to exploit the RMA by enhancing 
US capabilities for swift, decisive operations against a conventionally-organized 
enemy. Reflecting the emerging Bush Doctrine, QDR 2001 identified regime 
change as a military mission, but it scarcely addressed the potential implications 
in terms of stability and reconstruction operations once a hostile regime had 
been removed.
Afghanistan and Iraq became the first battlefields in the GWOT and a test-
ing ground for the Bush Administration’s concept of regime change. The admin-
istration held both operations up as models for future warfare: the US had rap-
idly toppled the Taliban and Saddam Hussein by using small, agile, networked 
ground forces operating in synergy with air power. However, overthrowing 
these hostile regimes turned out to be the least difficult part, and problems of a 
different nature soon ensued as US forces faced a protracted state of turmoil in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the Bush Administration had severely un-
derestimated the difficulties associated with the transition from a power vacuum 
to stability, not to mention the transition from dictatorship to democracy.
In the face of continuing difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq the Bush Ad-
ministration gradually changed its transformation policies and its overall ap-
proach to the use of military power, beginning in 2003. A number of Department 
of Defense directives issued in 2004–05 decreed that stability and reconstruction 
operations were henceforth to be assigned the same priority as major combat 
operations in the activities of the armed forces. The 2004 National Military 
Strategy, the 2005 National Defense Strategy, the 2006 National Security Strat-
egy, and the 2006 QDR increasingly addressed post-conflict operations and ir-
regular warfare. As part of its vision for the development of joint ground forces 
the QDR stated: “Future warriors will be as proficient in irregular operations, 
including counterinsurgency and stabilization operations, as they are today in 
high-intensity combat.” This change of policy at the national level was accom-
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panied by changes in the organization, force structure, etc., of the services.39 
This was certainly true for the Army. It should also be noted that among the 
military services, the Army has been assigned the primary responsibility for sta-
bility operations.40
THE REVIVAL OF COIN
Part of the Army’s COIN-related efforts was the development of new doctrine. 
The development of stability operations doctrine continued; in February 2003 
FM 3-07, Stability and Support Operations, was published. The manual super-
seded a number of 1990s doctrines dealing with what used to be called OOTW. 
In accordance with the terminological changes made in the 2001 edition of FM 
3-0, Operations the new FM 3-07 replaced the term OOTW with SASO, for 
Stability and Support Operations. SASO included those operations that had 
formerly been part of the OOTW concept, i.e. peace operations, counterdrug 
operations, etc. One form of SASO was Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and 
counterinsurgency was identified as one type of FID operation. It was thus a 
sub-sub-category of a larger set of operations, and the 2003 SASO doctrine’s  
treatment of COIN was rather meagre.41
An important step in the development of COIN doctrine was taken in 
October 2004 with the publication of FMI (Field Manual, Interim) 3-07.22, 
Counterinsurgency Operations. As mentioned previously this was the first of-
ficial COIN field manual to be published by the US Army since 1966. In FM 
3-07 COIN was embedded in the broader categories of SASO and FID and was 
discussed on a few pages out of some 230 in total. By contrast, the 2004 man-
ual was exclusively devoted to COIN and comprised 182 pages. Army COIN 
doctrine expanded further with the 2006 FM 3-24, a 282-page document.42 In 
39 See, for example, Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 204 and 227; Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 121–122; Michael R. Melillo, 
“Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Parameters, vol. 
XXXVI, no. 3 (2006), pp. 28–29; and Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 58–67. For the 
quotation, see Rumsfeld, QDR 2006, p. 42. (According to Metz, Learning from Iraq, 
p. 62, QDR 2006 did not use the words insurgency or counterinsurgency. However, 
one or both of these words appear on pp. 4, 19, 23, 36, 38, 42, 83, 90, and 91.)
40 On the Army’s special role, see, for example, Adams, The Army After Next, p. 
204; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, p. 35; and Nadia 
Schadlow, Charles Barry and Richard Laquement, “A Return to the Army’s Roots: 
Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction,” in The Future of the Army 
Profession, eds. Snider and Matthews, pp. 260 and 267.
41 Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss, p. 248; Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and 
Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?,” Parameters, vol. 
XXXV, no. 4 (2005), p. 33; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 
Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC, 2003), chapter 3.
42 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, pp. 3-3–3-6; Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
FM 3-24. For an analysis of FMI 3-07.22, which is primarily focused on the tactical 
level, see Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 131–132.
sum, the 2004 and 2006 COIN doctrines represent the dramatically increasing 
salience of COIN operations in Army doctrine.
When compared to the 2003 and 2004 doctrines, it is clear that FM 3-
24 also represents a turning point in Army COIN doctrine from a qualitative 
perspective. The new doctrine has been described as an indication of a “ma-
jor cultural shift in the military” and it has been stated that while the 2004 
manual “relied heavily on Vietnam-style insurgency as a conceptual template, 
the revised version released in December 2006 pressed beyond this, seeking to 
incorporate the changes insurgency has undergone since the Cold War.”43 This 
analysis of the two documents can be further elaborated. Using the analytical 
framework employed in this paper to compare the contents of the 2003, 2004, 
and 2006 doctrines, one could argue that FM 3-24 marks a rather clear-cut ac-
ceptance of the small war approach to COIN. Since FM 3-07 and FMI 3-07.22 
contain a mix of big war and small war elements, they are similar to previous 
post-Vietnam COIN doctrines. However, FMI 3-07.22 represents a considerable 
shift toward the small war approach. The manual could thus be described as a 
bridge between, on the one hand, the dominating trends in Army COIN doctrine 
since the Vietnam War and, on the other hand, the full acceptance of the small 
war approach as embodied by FM 3-24. 
The doctrinal evolution may be briefly summarized as follows. Regarding 
the character of insurgency, FM 3-24 shares to some extent the focus on Mao-
ist “people’s war” expressed in the 2003 and 2004 doctrines, but it takes many 
other possible forms of insurgency into account as well. Regarding the basis for 
COIN strategy, all three documents declare the primacy of political factors and 
the key role of legitimacy. However, FM 3-24 expands on these themes and also 
differs from the two other doctrines by emphasizing the need for adaptation, 
learning and flexibility. In terms of the degree of Army involvement, FM 3-24 ac-
cepts and advocates a potentially much wider and deeper degree of involvement 
than its forerunners. All of the doctrines advocate the same basic approach to 
the use of force, i.e. the principle of measured force, but FM 3-24 expands on the 
rationale underpinning the principle and elaborates on its practical implications. 
Finally, addressing the time frame, it can be stated that while the 2003 and 2004 
doctrines tend to view Army engagement in COIN operations as a short-term 
undertaking, FM 3-24 clearly embraces the view that a long-term commitment 
is necessary.
43 Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” p. 29; and 
Metz, Learning from Iraq, p. 65.
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bility operations.40
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formerly been part of the OOTW concept, i.e. peace operations, counterdrug 
operations, etc. One form of SASO was Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and 
counterinsurgency was identified as one type of FID operation. It was thus a 
sub-sub-category of a larger set of operations, and the 2003 SASO doctrine’s  
treatment of COIN was rather meagre.41
An important step in the development of COIN doctrine was taken in 
October 2004 with the publication of FMI (Field Manual, Interim) 3-07.22, 
Counterinsurgency Operations. As mentioned previously this was the first of-
ficial COIN field manual to be published by the US Army since 1966. In FM 
3-07 COIN was embedded in the broader categories of SASO and FID and was 
discussed on a few pages out of some 230 in total. By contrast, the 2004 man-
ual was exclusively devoted to COIN and comprised 182 pages. Army COIN 
doctrine expanded further with the 2006 FM 3-24, a 282-page document.42 In 
39 See, for example, Adams, The Army After Next, pp. 204 and 227; Cassidy, 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 121–122; Michael R. Melillo, 
“Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Parameters, vol. 
XXXVI, no. 3 (2006), pp. 28–29; and Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 58–67. For the 
quotation, see Rumsfeld, QDR 2006, p. 42. (According to Metz, Learning from Iraq, 
p. 62, QDR 2006 did not use the words insurgency or counterinsurgency. However, 
one or both of these words appear on pp. 4, 19, 23, 36, 38, 42, 83, 90, and 91.)
40 On the Army’s special role, see, for example, Adams, The Army After Next, p. 
204; Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, p. 35; and Nadia 
Schadlow, Charles Barry and Richard Laquement, “A Return to the Army’s Roots: 
Governance, Stabilization, and Reconstruction,” in The Future of the Army 
Profession, eds. Snider and Matthews, pp. 260 and 267.
41 Cassidy, Peacekeeping in the Abyss, p. 248; Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and 
Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?,” Parameters, vol. 
XXXV, no. 4 (2005), p. 33; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 
Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC, 2003), chapter 3.
42 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, pp. 3-3–3-6; Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
FM 3-24. For an analysis of FMI 3-07.22, which is primarily focused on the tactical 
level, see Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 131–132.
sum, the 2004 and 2006 COIN doctrines represent the dramatically increasing 
salience of COIN operations in Army doctrine.
When compared to the 2003 and 2004 doctrines, it is clear that FM 3-
24 also represents a turning point in Army COIN doctrine from a qualitative 
perspective. The new doctrine has been described as an indication of a “ma-
jor cultural shift in the military” and it has been stated that while the 2004 
manual “relied heavily on Vietnam-style insurgency as a conceptual template, 
the revised version released in December 2006 pressed beyond this, seeking to 
incorporate the changes insurgency has undergone since the Cold War.”43 This 
analysis of the two documents can be further elaborated. Using the analytical 
framework employed in this paper to compare the contents of the 2003, 2004, 
and 2006 doctrines, one could argue that FM 3-24 marks a rather clear-cut ac-
ceptance of the small war approach to COIN. Since FM 3-07 and FMI 3-07.22 
contain a mix of big war and small war elements, they are similar to previous 
post-Vietnam COIN doctrines. However, FMI 3-07.22 represents a considerable 
shift toward the small war approach. The manual could thus be described as a 
bridge between, on the one hand, the dominating trends in Army COIN doctrine 
since the Vietnam War and, on the other hand, the full acceptance of the small 
war approach as embodied by FM 3-24. 
The doctrinal evolution may be briefly summarized as follows. Regarding 
the character of insurgency, FM 3-24 shares to some extent the focus on Mao-
ist “people’s war” expressed in the 2003 and 2004 doctrines, but it takes many 
other possible forms of insurgency into account as well. Regarding the basis for 
COIN strategy, all three documents declare the primacy of political factors and 
the key role of legitimacy. However, FM 3-24 expands on these themes and also 
differs from the two other doctrines by emphasizing the need for adaptation, 
learning and flexibility. In terms of the degree of Army involvement, FM 3-24 ac-
cepts and advocates a potentially much wider and deeper degree of involvement 
than its forerunners. All of the doctrines advocate the same basic approach to 
the use of force, i.e. the principle of measured force, but FM 3-24 expands on the 
rationale underpinning the principle and elaborates on its practical implications. 
Finally, addressing the time frame, it can be stated that while the 2003 and 2004 
doctrines tend to view Army engagement in COIN operations as a short-term 
undertaking, FM 3-24 clearly embraces the view that a long-term commitment 
is necessary.
43 Melillo, “Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” p. 29; and 
Metz, Learning from Iraq, p. 65.
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THE CHARACTER OF INSURGENCy
Regarding the character of insurgency, FM 3-07 and FMI 3-07.22 share a simi-
lar outlook as their main model of insurgency is the Maoist “people’s war,” 
which begins with committed cadres mobilizing popular support, continues 
with guerrilla warfare, and concludes with conventional operations aimed at 
completing the insurgents’ seizure of power. (However, the latter document also 
identifies another model, “armed action,” distinct from Mao’s popular mobili-
zation).44 FM 3-24 represents an expanded and more elaborate understanding 
of the character of insurgency. It stresses the manifold and ever-changing forms 
of insurgency and the historical basis for the analysis has widened considerably 
beyond the Chinese, Vietnamese, and El Salvador models. For example, FM 3-
24 states the following:
Insurgency has taken many forms over time. Past insurgencies include struggles 
for independence against colonial powers, the rising up of ethnic or religious 
groups against their rivals, and resistance to foreign invaders. Students and prac-
titioners of COIN must begin to understand the specific circumstances of their 
particular situation. The history of this form of warfare shows how varied and 
adaptive it can be, and why students must understand that they cannot focus on 
countering just one insurgent approach. This is particularly true when address-
ing a continually complex, changing situation like that of Iraq in 2006.45
The doctrine further specifies the character of insurgency in more recent times 
thus:
While some Cold War insurgencies persisted after the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
many new ones appeared. These new insurgencies typically emerged from civil 
wars or the collapse of states no longer propped up by Cold War rivalries. Power 
vacuums breed insurgencies. Similar conditions exist when regimes are changed 
44 See Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, pp. 
17–18 and 20; Christopher M. Ford, “Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s 
Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency,” Parameters, vol. XXXV, no. 2 (2005), pp. 57 and 
61; Michael F. Morris, “Al-Qa´ida as Insurgency: The Quest for Islamic Revolution,” 
in Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, ed. 
Williamson Murray (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. 285. 
See also Ken Tovo, ”From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary 
Counterinsurgency Operations,” in Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and 
the Global War on Terror, ed. Murray, pp. 25 and 26, who identifies the Maoist 
model’s appearance in lower-level Army doctrine.
45 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-15, p. 1-3. Corum, “Rethinking 
US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” p. 136, also points out that the development 
of Army COIN doctrine has been accompanied by a “broad expansion of historical 
research and analysis on subjects relating to insurgency, nation-building and stability 
operations since 2003.”
by force or circumstances. Recently, ideologies based on extremist forms of reli-
gious or ethnic identities have replaced ideologies based on secular revolutionary 
ideals. These new forms of old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the 
most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars. These conflicts resemble 
the wars of religion in Europe before and after the Reformation of the 16th cen-
tury. People have replaced non-functioning national identities with traditional 
sources of unity and identity.46 
The doctrine also addresses differences and similarities between various insur-
gencies: “Each insurgency is unique, although there are often similarities among 
them. In all cases, insurgents aim to force political change; any military action 
is secondary and subordinate, a means to an end. Few insurgencies fit neatly 
into any rigid classification.” The doctrine then goes on to describe insurgent 
approaches. While the 2003 and 2004 manuals centred on one type, FM 3-24 
identifies seven insurgent approaches: conspiratorial, military-focused, urban, 
protracted popular war, identity-focused, and composite and coalition. Even so, 
when the various approaches are discussed, protracted popular war receives the 
most attention and Mao’s theory of protracted war and the Vietnamese example 
are discussed at some length. These proportions may be motivated by the as-
sessment that protracted popular war is one of the approaches most difficult to 
counter: “Protracted conflicts favour insurgents, and no approach makes better 
use of that asymmetry than the protracted popular war.” It is also stated that 
“some Al Qaeda leaders suggest [using this approach] in their writings today.” 
Furthermore, according to the doctrine, many contemporary insurgent move-
ments apply parts of this approach.47
THE bASIS OF COIN STRATEGy
The three documents share certain fundamental assumptions in their overall 
approach to COIN. One is that popular legitimacy is of crucial importance in 
COIN. Here, FM 3-24 differs from the 2003 and 2004 manuals primarily in its 
more detailed treatment of the subject. It also shares the view that Army efforts 
must be integrated into a political-military strategy. An important difference 
between FM 3-24 and the other documents, however, is that the new doctrine 
takes a less categorical view of appropriate COIN measures. While the 2003 
and 2004 doctrines are rather straightforward in their prescriptions, FM 3-24 
frequently qualifies its prescriptions by stressing that actions must be adapted to 
rapidly shifting circumstances, that counterinsurgents must be innovative, etc.
46 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-21, p. 1-4. See also Corum, 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” p. 133.
47 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, pp. 1-5–1-8. Of the four pages, two 
are devoted to analyzing “protracted popular war.” Quotations from 1-24, p. 1-5; and 
1-30, p. 1-6.
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more detailed treatment of the subject. It also shares the view that Army efforts 
must be integrated into a political-military strategy. An important difference 
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and 2004 doctrines are rather straightforward in their prescriptions, FM 3-24 
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46 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-21, p. 1-4. See also Corum, 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” p. 133.
47 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, pp. 1-5–1-8. Of the four pages, two 
are devoted to analyzing “protracted popular war.” Quotations from 1-24, p. 1-5; and 
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The 2003 and 2004 doctrines both stress the paramount importance of 
popular legitimacy in determining the outcome of the conflict. For example, FM 
3-07 states: “Success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the 
greater popular support.” It also stresses that support will go to the party that 
can offer the population the best conditions in terms of “political, social, and 
economic development.” According to FM 3-07, security operations performed 
by military and police forces “provide the necessary security environment in 
which development can occur.” FMI 3-07.22 states that COIN operations en-
compass all instruments of national power and emphasizes the need for coordi-
nation between the military and diplomatic efforts.48
FM 3-24 stresses that there is no single model of insurgency and emphasizes 
the need for flexibility on the part of the counterinsurgents. The doctrine states 
that correctly understanding the approach chosen by the insurgents is “essential 
to developing effective programs that attack the insurgency’s root causes.”49 In 
its analysis of “protracted popular war,” the form of insurgency to which the 
doctrine devotes the most space, it says:
Insurgents may use guerrilla tactics in one province while executing terrorist 
attacks and an urban approach in another. There may be differences in politi-
cal activities between villages in the same province. The result is […] a shifting 
“mosaic war” that is difficult for the counterinsurgents to envision as a coherent 
whole. In such situations, an effective COIN strategy must be multifaceted and 
flexible.50
The doctrine also identifies another contemporary insurgent modus operandi 
which is even more challenging for the counterinsurgents: “composite ap-
proaches and coalitions”:
As occurred in Iraq, contemporary insurgents may use different approaches 
at different times, applying tactics that take best advantage of circumstances. 
Insurgents may also apply a composite approach that includes tactics drawn 
from any or all of the other approaches. In addition – and as in Iraq at present 
– different insurgent forces using different approaches may form loose coali-
tions when it serves their interests; however, these same movements may fight 
48 See Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, pp. 
17–18 and 20; Ford, “Speak No Evil,” pp. 52, 57 and 61; Gerald E. Galloway, 
“Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, 2005), pp. 6 and 7–8; and Morris, “Al-Qa´ida as Insurgency,” pp. 
288–289. The full quote of the relevant passage in FM 3-07 can be found in Metz and 
Millen, p. 17; parts are also quoted in Ford, pp. 52 and 57.
49 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-25, p. 1-5.
50 Ibid., 1-37, p. 1-8.
among themselves, even while engaging counterinsurgents. […] This reality fur-
ther complicates both the mosaic that counterinsurgents must understand and 
the operations necessary for victory.51
These thoughts are also expressed in one of the doctrine’s “paradoxes of coun-
terinsurgency operations”: “If a Tactic Works this Week, It Might Not Work 
Next Week; If It Works in this Province, It Might Not Work in the Next.” This 
idea is elaborated on in the following way:
Competent insurgents are adaptive. […] Indeed, the more effective a COIN tac-
tic is, the faster it may become out of date because insurgents have a greater need 
to counter it. Effective leaders at all levels avoid complacency and are at least as 
adaptive as their enemies. There is no “silver bullet” set of COIN procedures. 
Constantly developing new practices is essential.52
Nevertheless, despite this emphasis on the multifaceted nature of the problem 
and the need for flexibility, adaptation, and learning, the doctrine states that 
there are commonalities between all insurgencies. For example, it says: “All 
insurgencies are different; however, broad historical trends underlie the factors 
motivating insurgents. Most insurgencies follow a similar course of develop-
ment.”53 The doctrine also identifies a number of COIN principles “derived 
from past insurgencies,” as well as “contemporary imperatives,” “paradoxes 
of COIN operations,” and “successful and unsuccessful COIN practices.” But 
the doctrine cautions against a simplistic reading or understanding of the prin-
ciples; they “provide some guideposts for forces engaged in COIN operations. 
However, COIN operations are complicated, and even following the principles 
and imperatives does not guarantee success. […] The following principles and 
imperatives are presented in the belief that understanding them helps illuminate 
the challenges inherent in defeating an insurgency.”54 The emphasis on avoid-
ing rigidity is clearly expressed in another passage, dealing with possible COIN 
approaches:
There are many approaches to achieving success in a COIN effort. The com-
ponents of each approach are not mutually exclusive. Several are shared by 
multiple approaches. The approaches described below are not the only choices 
available and are neither discrete nor exclusive. They may be combined, depend-
ing on the environment and the available resources. The following methods and 
51 Ibid., 1-39, p. 1-8.
52 Ibid., 1-155, p. 1-28.
53 Ibid., p. ix.
54 Ibid., pp. 1-20–1-29; quotation on p. 1-20.
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54 Ibid., pp. 1-20–1-29; quotation on p. 1-20.
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their components have proven effective. However, they must be adapted to the 
demands of the local environment.55
To some extent, the remedies prescribed by FM 3-24 are similar to those pre-
sented in the 2003 and 2004 doctrines, remedies that are essentially designed 
to defeat a people’s war type insurgency. Thomas R. Mockaitis has noted that 
FM 3-24 “emphasizes the primacy of a political as opposed to a military solu-
tion to the conflict and stresses unity of effort in combating the insurgents.” 
Mockaitis also mentions that the new manual identifies legitimacy as a crucial 
aspect of COIN and argues that political, social, and economic development is 
necessary to maintain legitimacy.56 In other words, FM 3-24 shares the same 
basic approach to COIN as the 2003 and 2004 doctrines. However, it offers a 
considerably deeper treatment of these common themes. This deepening is part 
of the more elaborate understanding of COIN represented by FM 3-24 and an 
account of its basic ideas are given in the following.
The following quote from the chapter “Executing Counterinsurgency Op-
erations” neatly summarizes some of the manual’s key points:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require synchronized application of mili-
tary, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions. Success-
ful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and 
the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and se-
curity. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal 
tensions, and injustice. As such, they defy non-violent solutions. Military forces 
can compel obedience and secure areas; however, they cannot by themselves 
achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Successful COIN 
efforts include civilian agencies, U.S. military forces, and multinational forces. 
These efforts purposefully attack the basis for the insurgency rather than just 
its fighters and comprehensively address the host nation’s core problems. Host-
nation (HN) leaders must be purposefully engaged in this effort and ultimately 
must take lead responsibility for it.57 
The importance of creating popular legitimacy is stressed throughout the docu-
ment. For example, in chapter 1 it is stated that “The primary objective of any 
COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate 
government.” At the end of the chapter the doctrine says, “At its core, COIN 
is a struggle for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support 
55 Ibid., 5-50, p. 5-18.
56 Mockaitis, The Iraq War, pp. 50 and 53–54 (quotation on p. 50).
57 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-1, p. 5-1. See also Corum, 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 132–133.
of the people are vital to success.” And, in the same vein: “Both insurgents and 
counterinsurgents are fighting for the support of the populace.”58
A closely related, pervading theme is the paramount role of political fac-
tors, including their implications for the Army’s role in the overall COIN effort 
and how they should affect military operations. Here, we also find similarities 
with the 2003 and 2004 doctrines. At the beginning of the document, it is stated 
that “the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.” The limits of the mili-
tary instrument are identified; for example, the doctrine says, “Military action 
can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate 
substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable 
peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instru-
ments of national power.” The doctrine stresses the need for balancing military 
and non-military measures and programs and asserts that “Military efforts are 
necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only 
effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all the instru-
ments of national power.”59
At this general level, then, FM 3-24 is similar to its 2003 and 2004 forerun-
ners in its overall approach to legitimacy as a crucial component of COIN and 
the need for an integrated civil-military strategy for achieving it. However, FM 
3-24 advocates a much more direct and comprehensive Army role in the frame-
work of an overarching interagency strategy. This brings us to the next aspect.
THE DEGREE OF ARmy INVOLVEmENT
FM 3-24 accepts and advocates a potentially much wider and deeper degree of 
Army involvement than its precursors. This change has three main components: 
first, the diffusion of responsibility for COIN; second, the attitude toward par-
ticipation in combat operations; and thirdly, the attitude toward participation 
in non-combat operations.
Concerning the diffusion of responsibility for COIN, FM 3-24 primarily 
differs from the 2004  FMI 3-07.22 by formalizing something that is implicit in 
the previous doctrine. To be more specific, both doctrines signal that COIN is 
no longer the preserve of Army Special Operations Forces. FMI 3-07.22 notes 
that since Vietnam, COIN tasks have “largely fallen on SOF […]”although con-
ventional forces have also been affected.60 It does not explicitly state that this 
division of labor should be changed, but the manual’s status as Army doctrine, 
rather than just Army Special Operations Forces doctrine, sufficiently demon-
58 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-113, p. 1-21; 1-159 and 1-160, p. 
1-28.
59 Ibid., 1-4, p. 1-1; 1-113, p. 1-21; 1-120, p. 1-22; 2-1, p. 2-1; and 2-5, p. 2-2.
60 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, p. vi.
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their components have proven effective. However, they must be adapted to the 
demands of the local environment.55
To some extent, the remedies prescribed by FM 3-24 are similar to those pre-
sented in the 2003 and 2004 doctrines, remedies that are essentially designed 
to defeat a people’s war type insurgency. Thomas R. Mockaitis has noted that 
FM 3-24 “emphasizes the primacy of a political as opposed to a military solu-
tion to the conflict and stresses unity of effort in combating the insurgents.” 
Mockaitis also mentions that the new manual identifies legitimacy as a crucial 
aspect of COIN and argues that political, social, and economic development is 
necessary to maintain legitimacy.56 In other words, FM 3-24 shares the same 
basic approach to COIN as the 2003 and 2004 doctrines. However, it offers a 
considerably deeper treatment of these common themes. This deepening is part 
of the more elaborate understanding of COIN represented by FM 3-24 and an 
account of its basic ideas are given in the following.
The following quote from the chapter “Executing Counterinsurgency Op-
erations” neatly summarizes some of the manual’s key points:
Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations require synchronized application of mili-
tary, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions. Success-
ful counterinsurgents support or develop local institutions with legitimacy and 
the ability to provide basic services, economic opportunity, public order, and se-
curity. The political issues at stake are often rooted in culture, ideology, societal 
tensions, and injustice. As such, they defy non-violent solutions. Military forces 
can compel obedience and secure areas; however, they cannot by themselves 
achieve the political settlement needed to resolve the situation. Successful COIN 
efforts include civilian agencies, U.S. military forces, and multinational forces. 
These efforts purposefully attack the basis for the insurgency rather than just 
its fighters and comprehensively address the host nation’s core problems. Host-
nation (HN) leaders must be purposefully engaged in this effort and ultimately 
must take lead responsibility for it.57 
The importance of creating popular legitimacy is stressed throughout the docu-
ment. For example, in chapter 1 it is stated that “The primary objective of any 
COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate 
government.” At the end of the chapter the doctrine says, “At its core, COIN 
is a struggle for the population’s support. The protection, welfare, and support 
55 Ibid., 5-50, p. 5-18.
56 Mockaitis, The Iraq War, pp. 50 and 53–54 (quotation on p. 50).
57 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-1, p. 5-1. See also Corum, 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” pp. 132–133.
of the people are vital to success.” And, in the same vein: “Both insurgents and 
counterinsurgents are fighting for the support of the populace.”58
A closely related, pervading theme is the paramount role of political fac-
tors, including their implications for the Army’s role in the overall COIN effort 
and how they should affect military operations. Here, we also find similarities 
with the 2003 and 2004 doctrines. At the beginning of the document, it is stated 
that “the Armed Forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.” The limits of the mili-
tary instrument are identified; for example, the doctrine says, “Military action 
can address the symptoms of a loss of legitimacy. In some cases, it can eliminate 
substantial numbers of insurgents. However, success in the form of a durable 
peace requires restoring legitimacy, which, in turn, requires the use of all instru-
ments of national power.” The doctrine stresses the need for balancing military 
and non-military measures and programs and asserts that “Military efforts are 
necessary and important to counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, but they are only 
effective when integrated into a comprehensive strategy employing all the instru-
ments of national power.”59
At this general level, then, FM 3-24 is similar to its 2003 and 2004 forerun-
ners in its overall approach to legitimacy as a crucial component of COIN and 
the need for an integrated civil-military strategy for achieving it. However, FM 
3-24 advocates a much more direct and comprehensive Army role in the frame-
work of an overarching interagency strategy. This brings us to the next aspect.
THE DEGREE OF ARmy INVOLVEmENT
FM 3-24 accepts and advocates a potentially much wider and deeper degree of 
Army involvement than its precursors. This change has three main components: 
first, the diffusion of responsibility for COIN; second, the attitude toward par-
ticipation in combat operations; and thirdly, the attitude toward participation 
in non-combat operations.
Concerning the diffusion of responsibility for COIN, FM 3-24 primarily 
differs from the 2004  FMI 3-07.22 by formalizing something that is implicit in 
the previous doctrine. To be more specific, both doctrines signal that COIN is 
no longer the preserve of Army Special Operations Forces. FMI 3-07.22 notes 
that since Vietnam, COIN tasks have “largely fallen on SOF […]”although con-
ventional forces have also been affected.60 It does not explicitly state that this 
division of labor should be changed, but the manual’s status as Army doctrine, 
rather than just Army Special Operations Forces doctrine, sufficiently demon-
58 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-113, p. 1-21; 1-159 and 1-160, p. 
1-28.
59 Ibid., 1-4, p. 1-1; 1-113, p. 1-21; 1-120, p. 1-22; 2-1, p. 2-1; and 2-5, p. 2-2.
60 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, p. vi.
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   35 12-07-07   08:38:58
36 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 5/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
strates that this doctrinal barrier was no longer considered relevant. FM 3-24 
explicitly spells out this change as it discusses training of HN forces:
For Soldiers and Marines, the mission of developing HN security forces goes 
beyond a task assigned to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training pro-
grams today and the scale of programs likely to be required in the future have 
grown. While FID has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special 
operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of 
regular and reserve units of all Services.61
The second component in the move toward a doctrinal sanction of a substan-
tially greater Army involvement in COIN has to do with the participation in 
combat operations. The 2003, 2004, and 2006 doctrines all attach great impor-
tance to the training of indigenous forces and do not describe US direct involve-
ment in combat operations as a preferred or primary option. Instead, the first 
priority should be to train HN forces, the ultimate goal being that they should 
eventually be capable of maintaining order and security in their country, a con-
dition which will in turn allow US forces to withdraw. (This focus on training 
indigenous forces is also to be found in the 2006 QDR, making it Department 
of Defense policy.)62 However, the 2006 doctrine goes considerably farther than 
its precursors in sanctioning a direct US combat role.
FM 3-07 of 2003 contains a very restrictive passage dealing with the in-
volvement in combat. A somewhat watered-down version of this passage ap-
pears in FMI 3-07.22, which states that “US forces may be required to engage 
in combat, either unilaterally or with multinational or HN forces.” The 2004 
doctrine continues:
As quickly as possible, though, HN military and police must assume the primary 
combat role. A long-term US combat role may undermine the legitimacy of the 
HN government and risks converting the conflict into a US-only war. […] On the 
occasion when the threat to US interests is great and indirect means have proven 
61 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 6-12, p. 6-3. See also 2-20, p. 
2-5. For further discussion, see Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency 
Doctrine,” p. 135. On the role of the Navy and Air Force in training foreign forces, see 
FM 3-24, 2-19, p. 2-5; and 6-15, pp. 6-3–6-4.
62 On the 2003 and 2004 doctrines’ position, see Metz and Millen, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, pp. 18 and 20; Robert M. Cassidy, “The Long 
Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency,” Parameters, vol. XXXVI, no. 
2 (2006), p. 48; and Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 
127–128. The link to QDR 2006 is mentioned in Cassidy’s Parameters article. For the 
2006 doctrine’s position, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, e.g., 1-
147, p. 1-16; 1-154, p. 1-27; 2-22, p. 2-5–2-6; 5-40, p. 5-13; 6-6, p. 6-2; 6-29, p. 6-6; 
and 6-107, p. 6-22; and Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” 
p. 133.
insufficient, preemptive US combat operations may be required. Direct use of US 
combat forces in counterinsurgency remains a policy option for the President, 
and Army forces provide it when required. […] US forces may conduct offensive 
operations to disrupt and destroy insurgent combat formations.63
Another passage in FMI 3-07.22 seems to qualify these rather restrictive pre-
scriptions slightly:
To the extent the HN has its basic institutions and security forces intact, the 
burden upon US and multinational forces and resources is lessened. To the ex-
tent the HN is lacking basic institutions and functions, the burden upon the US 
and multinational forces is increased. In the extreme, rather than building upon 
what is, the US and other nations will find themselves creating elements (such as 
local forces and government institutions) of the society they have been sent to 
assist. Military forces thus become involved in nation building while simultane-
ously attempting to defeat an insurgency.64
The 2004 doctrine thus accepts the prospect of doing most of the fighting in an 
initial phase, but only in “extreme” cases, which is concurrent with its restric-
tive view on US forces participating in combat. FM 3-24 contains a number of 
statements pertaining to the same issues. Taken together, these new statements 
amount to a lowering of the threshold for an extensive and possibly sustained 
US combat role. For example, at one point FM 3-24 states, “COIN efforts may 
require Soldiers and Marines to create the initial secure environment for the 
populace.” Similarly, it asserts that “In some cases, U.S. forces might be active-
ly engaged in fighting insurgents while simultaneously helping the host nation 
build its own security forces.” This notion is taken a step further in the follow-
ing section:
When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally 
focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government’s ability to defend 
itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support 
for the insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state 
collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping 
63 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 2-16 and 2-17, p. 2-3; and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-23 and 3-25, p. 3-7. See also 
Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 18.
64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 1-40, p. 1-10. My italics.
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strates that this doctrinal barrier was no longer considered relevant. FM 3-24 
explicitly spells out this change as it discusses training of HN forces:
For Soldiers and Marines, the mission of developing HN security forces goes 
beyond a task assigned to a few specialists. The scope and scale of training pro-
grams today and the scale of programs likely to be required in the future have 
grown. While FID has been traditionally the primary responsibility of the special 
operations forces (SOF), training foreign forces is now a core competency of 
regular and reserve units of all Services.61
The second component in the move toward a doctrinal sanction of a substan-
tially greater Army involvement in COIN has to do with the participation in 
combat operations. The 2003, 2004, and 2006 doctrines all attach great impor-
tance to the training of indigenous forces and do not describe US direct involve-
ment in combat operations as a preferred or primary option. Instead, the first 
priority should be to train HN forces, the ultimate goal being that they should 
eventually be capable of maintaining order and security in their country, a con-
dition which will in turn allow US forces to withdraw. (This focus on training 
indigenous forces is also to be found in the 2006 QDR, making it Department 
of Defense policy.)62 However, the 2006 doctrine goes considerably farther than 
its precursors in sanctioning a direct US combat role.
FM 3-07 of 2003 contains a very restrictive passage dealing with the in-
volvement in combat. A somewhat watered-down version of this passage ap-
pears in FMI 3-07.22, which states that “US forces may be required to engage 
in combat, either unilaterally or with multinational or HN forces.” The 2004 
doctrine continues:
As quickly as possible, though, HN military and police must assume the primary 
combat role. A long-term US combat role may undermine the legitimacy of the 
HN government and risks converting the conflict into a US-only war. […] On the 
occasion when the threat to US interests is great and indirect means have proven 
61 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 6-12, p. 6-3. See also 2-20, p. 
2-5. For further discussion, see Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency 
Doctrine,” p. 135. On the role of the Navy and Air Force in training foreign forces, see 
FM 3-24, 2-19, p. 2-5; and 6-15, pp. 6-3–6-4.
62 On the 2003 and 2004 doctrines’ position, see Metz and Millen, Insurgency and 
Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, pp. 18 and 20; Robert M. Cassidy, “The Long 
Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency,” Parameters, vol. XXXVI, no. 
2 (2006), p. 48; and Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror, pp. 
127–128. The link to QDR 2006 is mentioned in Cassidy’s Parameters article. For the 
2006 doctrine’s position, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, e.g., 1-
147, p. 1-16; 1-154, p. 1-27; 2-22, p. 2-5–2-6; 5-40, p. 5-13; 6-6, p. 6-2; 6-29, p. 6-6; 
and 6-107, p. 6-22; and Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” 
p. 133.
insufficient, preemptive US combat operations may be required. Direct use of US 
combat forces in counterinsurgency remains a policy option for the President, 
and Army forces provide it when required. […] US forces may conduct offensive 
operations to disrupt and destroy insurgent combat formations.63
Another passage in FMI 3-07.22 seems to qualify these rather restrictive pre-
scriptions slightly:
To the extent the HN has its basic institutions and security forces intact, the 
burden upon US and multinational forces and resources is lessened. To the ex-
tent the HN is lacking basic institutions and functions, the burden upon the US 
and multinational forces is increased. In the extreme, rather than building upon 
what is, the US and other nations will find themselves creating elements (such as 
local forces and government institutions) of the society they have been sent to 
assist. Military forces thus become involved in nation building while simultane-
ously attempting to defeat an insurgency.64
The 2004 doctrine thus accepts the prospect of doing most of the fighting in an 
initial phase, but only in “extreme” cases, which is concurrent with its restric-
tive view on US forces participating in combat. FM 3-24 contains a number of 
statements pertaining to the same issues. Taken together, these new statements 
amount to a lowering of the threshold for an extensive and possibly sustained 
US combat role. For example, at one point FM 3-24 states, “COIN efforts may 
require Soldiers and Marines to create the initial secure environment for the 
populace.” Similarly, it asserts that “In some cases, U.S. forces might be active-
ly engaged in fighting insurgents while simultaneously helping the host nation 
build its own security forces.” This notion is taken a step further in the follow-
ing section:
When countering an insurgency during the Cold War, the United States normally 
focused on increasing a threatened but friendly government’s ability to defend 
itself and on encouraging political and economic reforms to undercut support 
for the insurgency. Today, when countering an insurgency growing from state 
collapse or failure, counterinsurgents often face a more daunting task: helping 
63 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 2-16 and 2-17, p. 2-3; and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-23 and 3-25, p. 3-7. See also 
Metz and Millen, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century, p. 18.
64 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 1-40, p. 1-10. My italics.
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friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions 
may no longer exist.65
In sum, while the 2004 doctrine describes US forces taking the main responsi-
bility for creating basic stability and security as an extreme scenario, the new 
doctrine normalizes this prospect and at one point even states that it will occur 
frequently. In this context it should also be remembered that the statements in 
question are not counterbalanced by anything resembling the 2004 doctrine’s 
cautions regarding escalation and the morphing of a COIN engagement into a 
“US-only war.”
Further illustrating this line of development the new doctrine asserts that 
the “focus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct 
stages that can be envisioned with a medical analogy […]” The doctrine terms 
the first of these stages “stop the bleeding” and it is likened to “first aid for the 
patient.” More specifically, “The goal is to protect the population, break the 
insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the condition for further engage-
ment. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented 
by stability operations focused on civil security.” While this passage uses the 
general expression “counterinsurgents” and does not explicitly say that these ac-
tions should be performed by US forces, this meaning could be inferred from the 
description of the following two stages. (Stages two and three are termed “In-
patient care – recovery” and “Outpatient care – movement to self-sufficiency” 
respectively.) The creation of competent HN forces is mentioned as part of the 
second stage and the doctrine does not exclude direct US involvement in opera-
tions even in the final stage, albeit on a smaller scale.66 As this three-stage model 
is described as a general pattern for US involvement in COIN operations, the 
conclusion seems to be justified that direct Army combat operations during the 
initial phase is seen as the rule, rather than the exception.
As stated above, the new doctrine also sanctions a potentially much broad-
er involvement in the civilian-oriented tasks associated with nation-building. As 
noted previously, the 2004 doctrine describes the involvement of US forces in 
nation-building – i.e. efforts at establishing basic civilian institutions, rebuilding 
infrastructure, etc. – as an extreme possibility. The category corresponding most 
closely to nation-building in FMI 3-07.22 seems to be “Civil-Military Opera-
tions,” and the doctrine’s prescriptions for their conduct is wholly centred on 
such matters as law enforcement, population control, and helping establish a 
65 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, , 5-89, p. 5-25; 6-1, p. 6-1; and 
1-21, p. 1-4. All italics are mine. See also 1-147, p. 1-26: “the sooner the main effort 
can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.” (My 
emphasis.) This qualifier implies that as long as HN institutions, including security 
forces, are not capable of maintaining order, this will be the responsibility of US forces.
66 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-3–5-6, p. 5-2. My italics.
judicial system.67 While this is a deviation from strictly military tasks (with some 
exception for those of the military police), they still pertain to core security func-
tions, rather than more purely non-violent aspects of society.
Like the 2004 doctrine, the new doctrine does not consider civilian tasks the 
primary responsibility of US forces. However, it does sanction a much broader 
involvement in “civilian” operations. For example, FM 3-24 states that “An es-
sential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, these forces 
can and should use their capabilities to meet the local populace’s fundamental 
needs as well.”68 The doctrine expresses a rather pragmatic view regarding the 
division of labor between military and civilian agencies. For example, it states:
Political, social and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately 
associated with civilian organizations and expertise; however, effective imple-
mentation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. If 
adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces fill the gap.69
Furthermore, it is stated that “Most valuable to long-term success in winning 
the support of the populace are the contributions land forces can make by con-
ducting stability operations.” These operations, according to the doctrine, aim 
to “maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitar-
ian relief […].”70
The doctrine clearly spells out its views on the civilian-military division 
of labor. It starts by saying that “In COIN it is always preferred for civilians 
to perform civilian tasks.” But, for a number of reasons – including the limited 
capability of many civilian agencies for rapid overseas deployment and the level 
of violence in the area of operations – “the preferred or ideal division of labor is 
frequently unattainable.” In such a situation, the Army may take over all kinds 
of necessary civilian functions; however, this should only be “a temporary mea-
sure, one taken to address urgent circumstances.”71
But another passage opens up for a more long-term commitment. After 
noting that the military may have to play a leading role in developing services 
and infrastructure, the doctrine states that “COIN military planning includes 
preparing to perform these tasks for an extended period.” The services discussed 
include a broad range of categories: police and fire, water, electricity, schools, 
67 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, pp. 3-2–3-7.
68 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 2-4, p. 2-1.
69 Ibid., 2-5, p. 2-2. See also 2-13, p. 2-3.
70 Ibid., 2-22, p. 2-5.
71 Ibid., 2-41–2-42, p. 2-9. My italics. See also 5-42, p. 5-14.
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friendly forces reestablish political order and legitimacy where these conditions 
may no longer exist.65
In sum, while the 2004 doctrine describes US forces taking the main responsi-
bility for creating basic stability and security as an extreme scenario, the new 
doctrine normalizes this prospect and at one point even states that it will occur 
frequently. In this context it should also be remembered that the statements in 
question are not counterbalanced by anything resembling the 2004 doctrine’s 
cautions regarding escalation and the morphing of a COIN engagement into a 
“US-only war.”
Further illustrating this line of development the new doctrine asserts that 
the “focus of COIN operations generally progresses through three indistinct 
stages that can be envisioned with a medical analogy […]” The doctrine terms 
the first of these stages “stop the bleeding” and it is likened to “first aid for the 
patient.” More specifically, “The goal is to protect the population, break the 
insurgents’ initiative and momentum, and set the condition for further engage-
ment. Limited offensive operations may be undertaken, but are complemented 
by stability operations focused on civil security.” While this passage uses the 
general expression “counterinsurgents” and does not explicitly say that these ac-
tions should be performed by US forces, this meaning could be inferred from the 
description of the following two stages. (Stages two and three are termed “In-
patient care – recovery” and “Outpatient care – movement to self-sufficiency” 
respectively.) The creation of competent HN forces is mentioned as part of the 
second stage and the doctrine does not exclude direct US involvement in opera-
tions even in the final stage, albeit on a smaller scale.66 As this three-stage model 
is described as a general pattern for US involvement in COIN operations, the 
conclusion seems to be justified that direct Army combat operations during the 
initial phase is seen as the rule, rather than the exception.
As stated above, the new doctrine also sanctions a potentially much broad-
er involvement in the civilian-oriented tasks associated with nation-building. As 
noted previously, the 2004 doctrine describes the involvement of US forces in 
nation-building – i.e. efforts at establishing basic civilian institutions, rebuilding 
infrastructure, etc. – as an extreme possibility. The category corresponding most 
closely to nation-building in FMI 3-07.22 seems to be “Civil-Military Opera-
tions,” and the doctrine’s prescriptions for their conduct is wholly centred on 
such matters as law enforcement, population control, and helping establish a 
65 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, , 5-89, p. 5-25; 6-1, p. 6-1; and 
1-21, p. 1-4. All italics are mine. See also 1-147, p. 1-26: “the sooner the main effort 
can transition to HN institutions, without unacceptable degradation, the better.” (My 
emphasis.) This qualifier implies that as long as HN institutions, including security 
forces, are not capable of maintaining order, this will be the responsibility of US forces.
66 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-3–5-6, p. 5-2. My italics.
judicial system.67 While this is a deviation from strictly military tasks (with some 
exception for those of the military police), they still pertain to core security func-
tions, rather than more purely non-violent aspects of society.
Like the 2004 doctrine, the new doctrine does not consider civilian tasks the 
primary responsibility of US forces. However, it does sanction a much broader 
involvement in “civilian” operations. For example, FM 3-24 states that “An es-
sential COIN task for military forces is fighting insurgents; however, these forces 
can and should use their capabilities to meet the local populace’s fundamental 
needs as well.”68 The doctrine expresses a rather pragmatic view regarding the 
division of labor between military and civilian agencies. For example, it states:
Political, social and economic programs are most commonly and appropriately 
associated with civilian organizations and expertise; however, effective imple-
mentation of these programs is more important than who performs the tasks. If 
adequate civilian capacity is not available, military forces fill the gap.69
Furthermore, it is stated that “Most valuable to long-term success in winning 
the support of the populace are the contributions land forces can make by con-
ducting stability operations.” These operations, according to the doctrine, aim 
to “maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitar-
ian relief […].”70
The doctrine clearly spells out its views on the civilian-military division 
of labor. It starts by saying that “In COIN it is always preferred for civilians 
to perform civilian tasks.” But, for a number of reasons – including the limited 
capability of many civilian agencies for rapid overseas deployment and the level 
of violence in the area of operations – “the preferred or ideal division of labor is 
frequently unattainable.” In such a situation, the Army may take over all kinds 
of necessary civilian functions; however, this should only be “a temporary mea-
sure, one taken to address urgent circumstances.”71
But another passage opens up for a more long-term commitment. After 
noting that the military may have to play a leading role in developing services 
and infrastructure, the doctrine states that “COIN military planning includes 
preparing to perform these tasks for an extended period.” The services discussed 
include a broad range of categories: police and fire, water, electricity, schools, 
67 See Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, pp. 3-2–3-7.
68 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 2-4, p. 2-1.
69 Ibid., 2-5, p. 2-2. See also 2-13, p. 2-3.
70 Ibid., 2-22, p. 2-5.
71 Ibid., 2-41–2-42, p. 2-9. My italics. See also 5-42, p. 5-14.
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transportation network, medical, and sanitation (trash and sewage).72 It is also 
noted that in the absence of a functioning HN government, US efforts “may 
involve establishing and maintaining a military government or a civil admin-
istration while creating and organizing a HN capability to govern.”73 In sum, 
then, the new doctrine sanctions, and to some extent advocates, a much more 
comprehensive type of involvement for Army forces in COIN operations. This 
pertains to combat as well as non-combat operations.
THE USE OF FORCE
As mentioned previously, FM 3-24 adopts the principle of measured force as a 
guideline for the conduct of both US and indigenous forces. This does not itself 
represent a major difference between the new doctrine and its 2004 forerunner, 
but FM 3-24 seems to embrace the principle more wholeheartedly; it also ex-
pands on the motivations for adopting the principle and deepens the discussion 
of its practical application.74
At a general level FM 3-24 establishes that “Durable policy success re-
quires balancing the measured use of force with an emphasis on non-military 
programs.” It also notes that the use of force is often necessary to protect the 
populace, but: “Indeed, excessive use of military force can frequently undermine 
policy objectives at the expense of achieving the overarching political goals that 
define success. This dilemma places tremendous importance on the measured 
application of force.”75
The principle of measured force is to be all-pervasive: “In all applications 
of combat power, commanders must first ensure that likely costs do not out-
weigh or undermine other more important COIN efforts.”76 In another passage 
the doctrine gives an example of such calculations: “An operation that kills five 
insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 
fifty more insurgents.”77 The following prescriptions, ending with a phrasing 
that is clearly reminiscent of one found in the Marine Corps 1940 Small Wars 
Manual, are also indicative of FM 3-24’s approach to the use of force:
72 Ibid., 5-42, p. 5-14; and figure 5-4, p. 5-15.
73 Ibid., FM 3-24, 5-54, p. 5-15.
74 For the 2003 and 2004 doctrines’ position on the use of measured force, see 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-12, p. 3-4; and 3-30, p. 3-8; and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, pp. 2-13–2-15; p. 3-9 (the third 
“bullet” from the bottom of the table); and 3-40, p. 3-10. In addition to the following 
analysis, see Mockaitis, The Iraq War, p. 51; and Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, FM 3-24, 1-150–1-153 , p. 1-27; and 1-156, p. 1-28. On measured force as a 
principle for the conduct of HN forces, see, e.g., 1-141–1-143, p. 1-25; and 5-69, p. 
5-20.
75 Ibid., 2-3–2-5, pp. 2-1–2-2.
76 Ibid., 2-21, p. 2-5.
77 Ibid., 1-141, p. 1-25. See also 1-142.
Insurgents use unlawful violence to weaken the HN government, intimidate peo-
ple into passive or active support, and murder those who oppose the insurgency. 
Measured combat operations are always required to address insurgents who 
cannot be co-opted into operation inside the rule of the law. These operations 
may sometimes require overwhelming force and the killing of fanatic insurgents. 
However, COIN is “war amongst the people.” Combat operations must there-
fore be executed with an appropriate level of restraint to minimize or avoid 
injuring innocent people. Not only is there a moral basis for the use of restraint 
or measured force; there are practical reasons as well. Needlessly harming in-
nocents can turn the populace against the COIN effort. Discriminating use of 
fires and calculated, disciplined response should characterize COIN operations. 
Kindness and compassion can often be as important as killing and capturing 
insurgents.78
This last sentence may be taken as a point of departure for illustrating a 
subtle but interesting difference between FM 3-24 and the 2004 doctrine. If the 
emphasis on kindness and compassion epitomizes the acceptance of violence as 
a subordinate means in an essentially political struggle, FMI 3-07.22 contains 
two passages that can perhaps be considered vestiges of the big war approach to 
COIN. The 2004 doctrine’s discussion of rules of engagement (ROE) is gener-
ally pervaded by the principle of measured force. However, at one point, it is 
stated that the drawbacks of applying force excessively or indiscriminately must 
be weighed against another risk: “Insufficient use of force results in increased 
risks to US and multinational forces and perceived weaknesses that can jeopar-
dize the mission by emboldening insurgents and undermining domestic popular 
support.” This is directly followed by a sentence that potentially negates the 
primacy of political concerns:
Achieving the appropriate balance requires a thorough understanding of the 
nature and causes of the insurgency, the end state, and the military’s role in 
a counterinsurgency operation. Nevertheless, US forces always retain the right 
to use necessary and proportional force for individual and unit self-defense in 
response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.79
Nothing comparable to these statements appears in FM 3-24, which unequivo-
cally embraces the principle of measured force and seems to prefer to err on 
78 Ibid., 5-38, p. 5-12. The corresponding phrase in Small Wars Manual is, “In small 
wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote to our relationship 
with the mass of the population.” See Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 284.
79 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 2-66, p. 2-13. See also 2-71, 
p. 2-14: “Finally, leaders must balance the safety of their Soldiers with the safety of 
civilians.”
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transportation network, medical, and sanitation (trash and sewage).72 It is also 
noted that in the absence of a functioning HN government, US efforts “may 
involve establishing and maintaining a military government or a civil admin-
istration while creating and organizing a HN capability to govern.”73 In sum, 
then, the new doctrine sanctions, and to some extent advocates, a much more 
comprehensive type of involvement for Army forces in COIN operations. This 
pertains to combat as well as non-combat operations.
THE USE OF FORCE
As mentioned previously, FM 3-24 adopts the principle of measured force as a 
guideline for the conduct of both US and indigenous forces. This does not itself 
represent a major difference between the new doctrine and its 2004 forerunner, 
but FM 3-24 seems to embrace the principle more wholeheartedly; it also ex-
pands on the motivations for adopting the principle and deepens the discussion 
of its practical application.74
At a general level FM 3-24 establishes that “Durable policy success re-
quires balancing the measured use of force with an emphasis on non-military 
programs.” It also notes that the use of force is often necessary to protect the 
populace, but: “Indeed, excessive use of military force can frequently undermine 
policy objectives at the expense of achieving the overarching political goals that 
define success. This dilemma places tremendous importance on the measured 
application of force.”75
The principle of measured force is to be all-pervasive: “In all applications 
of combat power, commanders must first ensure that likely costs do not out-
weigh or undermine other more important COIN efforts.”76 In another passage 
the doctrine gives an example of such calculations: “An operation that kills five 
insurgents is counterproductive if collateral damage leads to the recruitment of 
fifty more insurgents.”77 The following prescriptions, ending with a phrasing 
that is clearly reminiscent of one found in the Marine Corps 1940 Small Wars 
Manual, are also indicative of FM 3-24’s approach to the use of force:
72 Ibid., 5-42, p. 5-14; and figure 5-4, p. 5-15.
73 Ibid., FM 3-24, 5-54, p. 5-15.
74 For the 2003 and 2004 doctrines’ position on the use of measured force, see 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-07, 3-12, p. 3-4; and 3-30, p. 3-8; and 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, pp. 2-13–2-15; p. 3-9 (the third 
“bullet” from the bottom of the table); and 3-40, p. 3-10. In addition to the following 
analysis, see Mockaitis, The Iraq War, p. 51; and Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, FM 3-24, 1-150–1-153 , p. 1-27; and 1-156, p. 1-28. On measured force as a 
principle for the conduct of HN forces, see, e.g., 1-141–1-143, p. 1-25; and 5-69, p. 
5-20.
75 Ibid., 2-3–2-5, pp. 2-1–2-2.
76 Ibid., 2-21, p. 2-5.
77 Ibid., 1-141, p. 1-25. See also 1-142.
Insurgents use unlawful violence to weaken the HN government, intimidate peo-
ple into passive or active support, and murder those who oppose the insurgency. 
Measured combat operations are always required to address insurgents who 
cannot be co-opted into operation inside the rule of the law. These operations 
may sometimes require overwhelming force and the killing of fanatic insurgents. 
However, COIN is “war amongst the people.” Combat operations must there-
fore be executed with an appropriate level of restraint to minimize or avoid 
injuring innocent people. Not only is there a moral basis for the use of restraint 
or measured force; there are practical reasons as well. Needlessly harming in-
nocents can turn the populace against the COIN effort. Discriminating use of 
fires and calculated, disciplined response should characterize COIN operations. 
Kindness and compassion can often be as important as killing and capturing 
insurgents.78
This last sentence may be taken as a point of departure for illustrating a 
subtle but interesting difference between FM 3-24 and the 2004 doctrine. If the 
emphasis on kindness and compassion epitomizes the acceptance of violence as 
a subordinate means in an essentially political struggle, FMI 3-07.22 contains 
two passages that can perhaps be considered vestiges of the big war approach to 
COIN. The 2004 doctrine’s discussion of rules of engagement (ROE) is gener-
ally pervaded by the principle of measured force. However, at one point, it is 
stated that the drawbacks of applying force excessively or indiscriminately must 
be weighed against another risk: “Insufficient use of force results in increased 
risks to US and multinational forces and perceived weaknesses that can jeopar-
dize the mission by emboldening insurgents and undermining domestic popular 
support.” This is directly followed by a sentence that potentially negates the 
primacy of political concerns:
Achieving the appropriate balance requires a thorough understanding of the 
nature and causes of the insurgency, the end state, and the military’s role in 
a counterinsurgency operation. Nevertheless, US forces always retain the right 
to use necessary and proportional force for individual and unit self-defense in 
response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.79
Nothing comparable to these statements appears in FM 3-24, which unequivo-
cally embraces the principle of measured force and seems to prefer to err on 
78 Ibid., 5-38, p. 5-12. The corresponding phrase in Small Wars Manual is, “In small 
wars, tolerance, sympathy, and kindness should be the keynote to our relationship 
with the mass of the population.” See Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, p. 284.
79 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 2-66, p. 2-13. See also 2-71, 
p. 2-14: “Finally, leaders must balance the safety of their Soldiers with the safety of 
civilians.”
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the side of caution when it comes to the application of the principle. While the 
divergences between the two doctrines’ approaches to the use of force should 
not be overstated, the differences between the sentences analyzed above seem 
to demonstrate a subtle shift encompassing the full acceptance of the measured 
force principle and the politically grounded rationale underpinning it.
THE TImE FRAmE
Finally, FM 3-24 emphasizes that COIN is a long-term commitment. Here, it dif-
fers from the 2003 and 2004 doctrines. These previous doctrines do not discuss 
the time frame of US COIN commitments in principal terms, but from their em-
phasis on turning over responsibilities to HN forces as quickly as possibly one 
can infer a preference for short-term commitments.80 The new doctrine asserts 
that “Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always de-
mand considerable expenditure of time and resources.” While repeating that 
the HN government must bear the ultimate responsibility, FM 3-24 argues that 
a long-term US role may be necessary for the successful outcome of a COIN 
effort. “The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the 
counterinsurgents and the HN government. Insurgents and local populations 
often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the United States to 
abandon a COIN effort.” This perception can be countered by “Constant reaf-
firmations of commitment, backed by deeds […].”
The doctrine goes on to identify the military and political requirements of a 
long-term COIN effort, one of them being “headquarters and support structures 
designed for long-term operations. […] Even in situations where the U.S. goal 
is reducing its military force levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN 
institutions usually remains for a long time.” In this discussion, the doctrine also 
touches upon political conditions in the US:
At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a pro-
tracted deployment is critical. Only the most senior military officers are involved 
in this process at all. It is properly a political activity. However, military leaders 
typically take care to ensure that their actions and statements are forthright. 
They also ensure that the conduct of operations neither makes it harder for 
elected leaders to maintain public support nor undermines public confidence.
80 On the 2003 and 2004 doctrines’ attitude to HN responsibility, see the section on 
“The Degree of Army Involvement” above. In section 2-2, p. 2-1, FMI 3-07.22 claims 
that insurgencies “are protracted”; this leads to a recommendation for interagency 
coordination but no discussion corresponding to that in FM 3-24 is to be found. 
Similarly, in section 2-3, the 2004 doctrine briefly notes that building HN capabilities 
may be costly and time-consuming. The following analysis of FM 3-24’s approach to 
long-term COIN commitments is primarily based on Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, FM 3-24, 1-134–1-136, p. 1-24. See also Mockaitis, The Iraq War, p. 51.
The theme of a long-term commitment is echoed in the doctrine’s treatment of 
the operational level. In the description of one of the COIN approaches, it is 
stated that “Clear-hold-build objectives require lots of resources and time. U.S. 
and HN commanders should prepare for a long-term effort.” (FMI 3-07.22 con-
tains a very similar assessment of this type of operations, but unlike FM 3-24 it 
does not extend the implications to the strategic or political levels.)81
Conclusion
As we have seen, FM 3-24 represents an important step in the evolution of US 
Army COIN doctrine. First, it is a manifestation of a trend involving a dramati-
cally increased doctrinal interest in COIN. Second, it differs from all other Army 
post-Vietnam COIN doctrines in the sense that it fully embraces the small war 
approach to COIN. In contrast, previous post-Vietnam COIN doctrines have 
contained a mix of big war and small war elements. In doctrinal terms, this is 
a profound change. Some of the same trends can be identified in the temporary 
COIN doctrine of 2004, but they are more clearly manifested in the 2006 doc-
trine. When compared to previous doctrines, FM 3-24 demonstrates a more 
complex understanding of the character of insurgency and more fully embraces 
a political, as opposed to a military, basis for COIN strategy. It advocates a 
potentially broader and deeper degree of Army involvement in COIN. Further-
more, it wholeheartedly adopts the principle of measured force and views COIN 
as a long-term commitment.82 This final section will place the new doctrine in 
a wider perspective by tentatively addressing some of the issues raised in the 
introductory section, i.e. its potential impact on current and future operations 
and its role in enhancing US military capabilities.
WILL IT WORK?
The most immediate concern regarding the doctrine, on the part of the Army 
as well as its political masters, is presumably and understandably whether it 
can help untangle the current imbroglios in Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted 
above, the doctrine itself identifies a number of strategic requirements necessary 
for a successful COIN campaign, such as sufficient time, money, and political 
support. Assuming that this assessment is correct, one might pose the question 
81 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-53, p. 5-18; and Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 3-60, p. 3-14.
82 Once again, the reader is reminded of the significance of the analytical framework 
underpinning these conclusions and of the fact that a different design might have led 
to a different result. However, it is reasonable to assume that the framework used 
is sufficient for demonstrating the overall tendencies of the doctrinal development 
identified in the paper; and as pointed out previously, Corum’s analysis of other 
aspects of the new doctrine point in the same direction.
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the side of caution when it comes to the application of the principle. While the 
divergences between the two doctrines’ approaches to the use of force should 
not be overstated, the differences between the sentences analyzed above seem 
to demonstrate a subtle shift encompassing the full acceptance of the measured 
force principle and the politically grounded rationale underpinning it.
THE TImE FRAmE
Finally, FM 3-24 emphasizes that COIN is a long-term commitment. Here, it dif-
fers from the 2003 and 2004 doctrines. These previous doctrines do not discuss 
the time frame of US COIN commitments in principal terms, but from their em-
phasis on turning over responsibilities to HN forces as quickly as possibly one 
can infer a preference for short-term commitments.80 The new doctrine asserts 
that “Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always de-
mand considerable expenditure of time and resources.” While repeating that 
the HN government must bear the ultimate responsibility, FM 3-24 argues that 
a long-term US role may be necessary for the successful outcome of a COIN 
effort. “The populace must have confidence in the staying power of both the 
counterinsurgents and the HN government. Insurgents and local populations 
often believe that a few casualties or a few years will cause the United States to 
abandon a COIN effort.” This perception can be countered by “Constant reaf-
firmations of commitment, backed by deeds […].”
The doctrine goes on to identify the military and political requirements of a 
long-term COIN effort, one of them being “headquarters and support structures 
designed for long-term operations. […] Even in situations where the U.S. goal 
is reducing its military force levels as quickly as possible, some support for HN 
institutions usually remains for a long time.” In this discussion, the doctrine also 
touches upon political conditions in the US:
At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a pro-
tracted deployment is critical. Only the most senior military officers are involved 
in this process at all. It is properly a political activity. However, military leaders 
typically take care to ensure that their actions and statements are forthright. 
They also ensure that the conduct of operations neither makes it harder for 
elected leaders to maintain public support nor undermines public confidence.
80 On the 2003 and 2004 doctrines’ attitude to HN responsibility, see the section on 
“The Degree of Army Involvement” above. In section 2-2, p. 2-1, FMI 3-07.22 claims 
that insurgencies “are protracted”; this leads to a recommendation for interagency 
coordination but no discussion corresponding to that in FM 3-24 is to be found. 
Similarly, in section 2-3, the 2004 doctrine briefly notes that building HN capabilities 
may be costly and time-consuming. The following analysis of FM 3-24’s approach to 
long-term COIN commitments is primarily based on Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, FM 3-24, 1-134–1-136, p. 1-24. See also Mockaitis, The Iraq War, p. 51.
The theme of a long-term commitment is echoed in the doctrine’s treatment of 
the operational level. In the description of one of the COIN approaches, it is 
stated that “Clear-hold-build objectives require lots of resources and time. U.S. 
and HN commanders should prepare for a long-term effort.” (FMI 3-07.22 con-
tains a very similar assessment of this type of operations, but unlike FM 3-24 it 
does not extend the implications to the strategic or political levels.)81
Conclusion
As we have seen, FM 3-24 represents an important step in the evolution of US 
Army COIN doctrine. First, it is a manifestation of a trend involving a dramati-
cally increased doctrinal interest in COIN. Second, it differs from all other Army 
post-Vietnam COIN doctrines in the sense that it fully embraces the small war 
approach to COIN. In contrast, previous post-Vietnam COIN doctrines have 
contained a mix of big war and small war elements. In doctrinal terms, this is 
a profound change. Some of the same trends can be identified in the temporary 
COIN doctrine of 2004, but they are more clearly manifested in the 2006 doc-
trine. When compared to previous doctrines, FM 3-24 demonstrates a more 
complex understanding of the character of insurgency and more fully embraces 
a political, as opposed to a military, basis for COIN strategy. It advocates a 
potentially broader and deeper degree of Army involvement in COIN. Further-
more, it wholeheartedly adopts the principle of measured force and views COIN 
as a long-term commitment.82 This final section will place the new doctrine in 
a wider perspective by tentatively addressing some of the issues raised in the 
introductory section, i.e. its potential impact on current and future operations 
and its role in enhancing US military capabilities.
WILL IT WORK?
The most immediate concern regarding the doctrine, on the part of the Army 
as well as its political masters, is presumably and understandably whether it 
can help untangle the current imbroglios in Iraq and Afghanistan. As noted 
above, the doctrine itself identifies a number of strategic requirements necessary 
for a successful COIN campaign, such as sufficient time, money, and political 
support. Assuming that this assessment is correct, one might pose the question 
81 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 5-53, p. 5-18; and Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22, 3-60, p. 3-14.
82 Once again, the reader is reminded of the significance of the analytical framework 
underpinning these conclusions and of the fact that a different design might have led 
to a different result. However, it is reasonable to assume that the framework used 
is sufficient for demonstrating the overall tendencies of the doctrinal development 
identified in the paper; and as pointed out previously, Corum’s analysis of other 
aspects of the new doctrine point in the same direction.
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whether these conditions will be forthcoming. If not, the doctrine will not prove 
its potential in these trouble spots. On the other hand, given that the doctrine 
is sound, it may help to reduce the number of US casualties and ameliorate the 
situation on the ground in Iraq, even if it were to prove insufficient to achieve 
strategic success.
In order to further US goals in Afghanistan and Iraq, the doctrine must 
also be based on a valid analysis of the type of conflict that is being fought and 
of the methods used to acheive  victory. Steven Metz and Thomas R. Mockaitis, 
both distinguished COIN scholars, take a rather positive view of the doctrine’s 
adequacy, although Mockaitis questions its ranking of political goals over social 
and economic ones as being potentially detrimental.83
This criticism, however, does not challenge the core assumptions of the 
doctrine. A more fundamental critique of US policy in Iraq, with implications 
for the new doctrine, has been raised by the leading military analyst Stephen 
Biddle. In his 2006 article, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Biddle argues 
that US strategy in Iraq has basic similarities to its strategy in Vietnam; Like the 
Vietnam strategy, the Iraq strategy is “built around winning hearts and minds 
while handing off more and more of the fighting to indigenous forces.” Accord-
ing to Biddle, US strategy in Iraq is deeply flawed. A Maoist people’s war, like 
the one waged in Vietnam, may be won by the side that offers the population 
superior material conditions and governance. However, communal civil wars, 
like the ones in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, are “about group survival, not 
about the superiority of one party’s ideology or one side’s ability to deliver better 
governance.”84 Iraq, Biddle argues, is a communal civil war. Economic recon-
struction will not reconcile the various sectarian groups, and democratization 
may prove positively harmful. Moreover,
The biggest problem with treating Iraq like Vietnam is Iraqization – the main 
component of the current U.S. military strategy. In a people’s war, handing the 
fighting off to local forces makes sense because it undermines the nationalist 
component of insurgent resistance, improves the quality of local intelligence, 
and boosts troop strength. But in a communal civil war, it throws gasoline on 
the fire. Iraq’s Sunnis perceive the “national” army and police force as a Shiite-
Kurdish militia on steroids. And they have a point: in a communal conflict, the 
only effective units are the ones that do not intermingle communal enemies.85 
83 Metz, Learning from Iraq, p. 65; and Mockaitis, The Iraq War, pp. 53–54.
84 Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 
(2006), pp. 3–5 and 8. (Quotations on pp. 3 and 5.) For a similar analysis, see Metz, 
Learning from Iraq, pp. 83–84: “In a cultural struggle, identity structures already 
exist. ‘Hearts and minds’ are not subject to competition.”
85 Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” p. 8.
In essence, Biddle sees current US military strategy in Iraq facing the choice of 
either making Iraqi security forces an instrument for Shiite and/or Kurdish re-
pression against the Sunnis, or rendering these forces inefficient by making them 
ethnically integrated.86
If Biddle’s criticism is valid, it also has implications for FM 3-24. As previ-
ously described, training HN forces is central to the new doctrine, although it 
sanctions a more far-reaching direct participation of US forces than did previous 
doctrines. FM 3-24 addresses some of the problems raised by Biddle; it recog-
nizes religious and ethnic identities as central factors in current internal wars 
and also addresses some of the problems identified by Biddle (albeit with no 
explicit reference to Iraq).87 In principle, the doctrine’s overarching pragmatism 
and emphasis on flexibility in the choice of means also offer a safeguard against 
an over-reliance on HN forces. Nevertheless, HN forces are a centrepiece of the 
doctrine and if Biddle’s analysis is correct, a substantial revision of its approach 
to HN forces seems warranted. On at least one point the doctrine rather cat-
egorically takes a view that is incompatible with Biddle’s analysis, as it asserts 
that the integration of various ethnic groups in HN security forces “must be 
included in the recruiting effort.” (This position is taken even while recognizing 
that “Most HN governments will resist” this recruitment policy.)88 Assuming 
that Biddle’s criticism is valid, and to the extent that doctrine is actually shaping 
the actions of US forces, such a doctrinal adjustment would be a necessary, but 
not a sufficient, condition for an optimal handling of the Iraq situation.
FM 3-24  AND FUTURE CAPAbILITIES
Obviously, the validity of the doctrine also has potential implications beyond 
Iraq and Afghanistan. A valid doctrine may help to increase the likelihood of 
success in future COIN operations, whereas a flawed doctrine is likely to have 
the opposite effect. Important as the endorsing of the small war approach is in 
itself, it is conceivable that the complex understanding of insurgency and coun-
terinsurgency, together with the emphasis on learning, adaptation, flexibility, 
and pragmatism, may have an even greater impact. If the doctrine has struck the 
right balance between sound imperatives and prescription, on the one hand, and 
innovation and imagination on the other, it may work as a highly potent force 
multiplier. Such an “optimal” approach would entail, for example, the ability to 
wage a COIN campaign focusing on countering a “people’s war” strategy when 
86 Ibid., pp. 8–9. On pp. 9–14, Biddle discussed possible alternatives to the present 
course.
87 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-21, p. 1-4; 1-143, p. 1-25; 6-10, 
pp. 6-2–6-3; and 6-45, pp. 6-9–6-10. See also 1-15, p. 1-3.
88 Ibid., 6-45, pp. 6-9–6-10.
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whether these conditions will be forthcoming. If not, the doctrine will not prove 
its potential in these trouble spots. On the other hand, given that the doctrine 
is sound, it may help to reduce the number of US casualties and ameliorate the 
situation on the ground in Iraq, even if it were to prove insufficient to achieve 
strategic success.
In order to further US goals in Afghanistan and Iraq, the doctrine must 
also be based on a valid analysis of the type of conflict that is being fought and 
of the methods used to acheive  victory. Steven Metz and Thomas R. Mockaitis, 
both distinguished COIN scholars, take a rather positive view of the doctrine’s 
adequacy, although Mockaitis questions its ranking of political goals over social 
and economic ones as being potentially detrimental.83
This criticism, however, does not challenge the core assumptions of the 
doctrine. A more fundamental critique of US policy in Iraq, with implications 
for the new doctrine, has been raised by the leading military analyst Stephen 
Biddle. In his 2006 article, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Biddle argues 
that US strategy in Iraq has basic similarities to its strategy in Vietnam; Like the 
Vietnam strategy, the Iraq strategy is “built around winning hearts and minds 
while handing off more and more of the fighting to indigenous forces.” Accord-
ing to Biddle, US strategy in Iraq is deeply flawed. A Maoist people’s war, like 
the one waged in Vietnam, may be won by the side that offers the population 
superior material conditions and governance. However, communal civil wars, 
like the ones in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, are “about group survival, not 
about the superiority of one party’s ideology or one side’s ability to deliver better 
governance.”84 Iraq, Biddle argues, is a communal civil war. Economic recon-
struction will not reconcile the various sectarian groups, and democratization 
may prove positively harmful. Moreover,
The biggest problem with treating Iraq like Vietnam is Iraqization – the main 
component of the current U.S. military strategy. In a people’s war, handing the 
fighting off to local forces makes sense because it undermines the nationalist 
component of insurgent resistance, improves the quality of local intelligence, 
and boosts troop strength. But in a communal civil war, it throws gasoline on 
the fire. Iraq’s Sunnis perceive the “national” army and police force as a Shiite-
Kurdish militia on steroids. And they have a point: in a communal conflict, the 
only effective units are the ones that do not intermingle communal enemies.85 
83 Metz, Learning from Iraq, p. 65; and Mockaitis, The Iraq War, pp. 53–54.
84 Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 
(2006), pp. 3–5 and 8. (Quotations on pp. 3 and 5.) For a similar analysis, see Metz, 
Learning from Iraq, pp. 83–84: “In a cultural struggle, identity structures already 
exist. ‘Hearts and minds’ are not subject to competition.”
85 Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” p. 8.
In essence, Biddle sees current US military strategy in Iraq facing the choice of 
either making Iraqi security forces an instrument for Shiite and/or Kurdish re-
pression against the Sunnis, or rendering these forces inefficient by making them 
ethnically integrated.86
If Biddle’s criticism is valid, it also has implications for FM 3-24. As previ-
ously described, training HN forces is central to the new doctrine, although it 
sanctions a more far-reaching direct participation of US forces than did previous 
doctrines. FM 3-24 addresses some of the problems raised by Biddle; it recog-
nizes religious and ethnic identities as central factors in current internal wars 
and also addresses some of the problems identified by Biddle (albeit with no 
explicit reference to Iraq).87 In principle, the doctrine’s overarching pragmatism 
and emphasis on flexibility in the choice of means also offer a safeguard against 
an over-reliance on HN forces. Nevertheless, HN forces are a centrepiece of the 
doctrine and if Biddle’s analysis is correct, a substantial revision of its approach 
to HN forces seems warranted. On at least one point the doctrine rather cat-
egorically takes a view that is incompatible with Biddle’s analysis, as it asserts 
that the integration of various ethnic groups in HN security forces “must be 
included in the recruiting effort.” (This position is taken even while recognizing 
that “Most HN governments will resist” this recruitment policy.)88 Assuming 
that Biddle’s criticism is valid, and to the extent that doctrine is actually shaping 
the actions of US forces, such a doctrinal adjustment would be a necessary, but 
not a sufficient, condition for an optimal handling of the Iraq situation.
FM 3-24  AND FUTURE CAPAbILITIES
Obviously, the validity of the doctrine also has potential implications beyond 
Iraq and Afghanistan. A valid doctrine may help to increase the likelihood of 
success in future COIN operations, whereas a flawed doctrine is likely to have 
the opposite effect. Important as the endorsing of the small war approach is in 
itself, it is conceivable that the complex understanding of insurgency and coun-
terinsurgency, together with the emphasis on learning, adaptation, flexibility, 
and pragmatism, may have an even greater impact. If the doctrine has struck the 
right balance between sound imperatives and prescription, on the one hand, and 
innovation and imagination on the other, it may work as a highly potent force 
multiplier. Such an “optimal” approach would entail, for example, the ability to 
wage a COIN campaign focusing on countering a “people’s war” strategy when 
86 Ibid., pp. 8–9. On pp. 9–14, Biddle discussed possible alternatives to the present 
course.
87 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-24, 1-21, p. 1-4; 1-143, p. 1-25; 6-10, 
pp. 6-2–6-3; and 6-45, pp. 6-9–6-10. See also 1-15, p. 1-3.
88 Ibid., 6-45, pp. 6-9–6-10.
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appropriate and using substantially different methods in a scenario that may 
pose other challenges, such as a sectarian civil war.89
Discussing future capabilities, it is worth repeating that although doctrine 
is an important indicator of the Army’s mentality and capabilities, adopting a 
relevant and valid doctrine does not in itself guarantee proficiency in COIN 
operations. Several analysts argue that Army culture, with its deep roots in the 
big war paradigm, is a major impediment to the enhancement of Army COIN 
capabilities. It is a matter of debate whether this culture can be changed so as 
to allow the Army to fully embrace a role as a COIN and stability operations 
force, not just a war-fighting force, but some recent analyses make a rather op-
timistic assessment of this factor. James S. Corum has analyzed these issues in 
generational terms:
In conflicts involving non-state enemies, nation building is a primary task, and 
the traditional principles of war that emphasize destruction of conventional en-
emy armed forces are largely irrelevant to such wars – and can even be counter-
productive. The young captains and majors who have served in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan certainly understand these concepts, but it will be difficult for many 
in the senior leadership, who have focused on conventional warfare for their 
whole career, to adjust to what the doctrine describes as a fundamentally differ-
ent kind of war.90
Finally, it can be assumed that in order for a doctrine to actually translate into 
capabilities, it must be accompanied by the means and other conditions needed 
for its execution. In other words, to the extent that funding, training, education, 
equipment, organization, force structure, etc., are not geared toward conducting 
COIN operations, the impact of COIN operations doctrine is likely to be cor-
respondingly limited.91
Certain factors at the national security policy level could underpin the cur-
rent trend of a growing importance of COIN. These factors include a continu-
ation of “the Global War on Terror,” continued concern with “rogue states,” 
“failed states,” and regime change; and sustained political pressure for enhanced 
89 For further discussion of current and future conflicts and their implications for 
US doctrine, see David Kilcullen, “Counter-insurgency Redux,” Survival, vol. 48, 
no. 4 (2006); Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 76–91; and Steven Metz, Rethinking 
Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).
90 Corum, “Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” p. 133. On the role of 
Army culture, see also for example Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on 
Terror; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; and Metz, Learning from Iraq, pp. 
89–90.
91 On the implications for organization and training, see, e.g., Mockaitis, The Iraq War, 
pp. 57–58. On the implications for force structure, see, e.g., Corum, “Rethinking US 
Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” p. 139.
COIN capabilities. Relative American success in Afghanistan and/or Iraq, the 
likelihood of which will not be discussed in detail here, may work in the same 
direction. Other conceivable scenarios, involving Pakistan, Indonesia, Congo, 
or Saudi Arabia, may also underpin the current trend.92 Conversely, failure in 
Afghanistan and/or Iraq may strengthen an opposite trend at the political level, 
namely rejection of COIN, nation-building, and stability operations, combined 
with an increasing US restraint regarding military intervention in general. Such 
an approach to military intervention would in some respects be comparable to 
that epitomized by the Nixon, Weinberger and Powell doctrines and expressed 
by George W. Bush in the 2000 election campaign. As Steven Metz points out, 
“Iraq has reinvigorated the Vietnam-era idea that the United States simply 
should not undertake counterinsurgency.”93
Another possibility that could also stymie or dilute the rising importance of 
Army COIN capabilities and doctrine is that other perceived threats may come 
to dominate US security policy. Some of these threats may be seen not to war-
rant COIN capabilities, but rather conventional combat skills. For example, if 
China becomes the focal point of US security concerns,94 the US government will 
probably have another reason to prioritize military capabilities for war-fighting 
against other nation-states rather than unconventional warfare and stability op-
erations. This possibility exists independent of the outcome in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, but a rejection of COIN due to US failure in those countries may converge 
with increasing concerns over China; the two factors may thus be mutually re-
inforcing in diverting US attention from COIN.
In this context, a core question is also whether US national strategic cul-
ture may evolve in a direction that is conducive to the sustained development 
of COIN capabilities and that allows repeated and sustained COIN commit-
ments. Colin S. Gray has asked whether “the American Way of War” can adapt 
to the requirements of successfully fighting irregular opponents. His answer is, 
“perhaps, but only with difficulty.”95 In a structural sense, this issue is similar 
92 For discussion of these latter scenarios, see Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, 
“The Case for Larger Ground Forces,” Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide, April 2007 
(Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation).
93 Metz, Learning from Iraq, p. 59.
94 For discussion of the China factor see, for example, Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 
374–377; and Svein Melby, “Stormaktspolitikkens renessanse? ,” [The Renaissance 
of Great Power Politics?] in Svein Melby, Johannes Rø, Olof Kronvall and Anders G. 
Romarheim, Supermaktens begrensning. Perspektiver på Bush-doktrinens utvikling 
[The Limits of the Superpower – Perspectives on the Development of the Bush 
Doctrine], IFS Info, no. 6 (Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2006), pp. 
11–13.
95 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American 
Way of War Adapt? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2006), p. 55. 
See also Jeffrey Record, “The American Way of War. Cultural Barriers to Successful 
Counterinsurgency,” Policy Briefing #577 (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 
2006).
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operations. Several analysts argue that Army culture, with its deep roots in the 
big war paradigm, is a major impediment to the enhancement of Army COIN 
capabilities. It is a matter of debate whether this culture can be changed so as 
to allow the Army to fully embrace a role as a COIN and stability operations 
force, not just a war-fighting force, but some recent analyses make a rather op-
timistic assessment of this factor. James S. Corum has analyzed these issues in 
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the traditional principles of war that emphasize destruction of conventional en-
emy armed forces are largely irrelevant to such wars – and can even be counter-
productive. The young captains and majors who have served in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan certainly understand these concepts, but it will be difficult for many 
in the senior leadership, who have focused on conventional warfare for their 
whole career, to adjust to what the doctrine describes as a fundamentally differ-
ent kind of war.90
Finally, it can be assumed that in order for a doctrine to actually translate into 
capabilities, it must be accompanied by the means and other conditions needed 
for its execution. In other words, to the extent that funding, training, education, 
equipment, organization, force structure, etc., are not geared toward conducting 
COIN operations, the impact of COIN operations doctrine is likely to be cor-
respondingly limited.91
Certain factors at the national security policy level could underpin the cur-
rent trend of a growing importance of COIN. These factors include a continu-
ation of “the Global War on Terror,” continued concern with “rogue states,” 
“failed states,” and regime change; and sustained political pressure for enhanced 
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89–90.
91 On the implications for organization and training, see, e.g., Mockaitis, The Iraq War, 
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with an increasing US restraint regarding military intervention in general. Such 
an approach to military intervention would in some respects be comparable to 
that epitomized by the Nixon, Weinberger and Powell doctrines and expressed 
by George W. Bush in the 2000 election campaign. As Steven Metz points out, 
“Iraq has reinvigorated the Vietnam-era idea that the United States simply 
should not undertake counterinsurgency.”93
Another possibility that could also stymie or dilute the rising importance of 
Army COIN capabilities and doctrine is that other perceived threats may come 
to dominate US security policy. Some of these threats may be seen not to war-
rant COIN capabilities, but rather conventional combat skills. For example, if 
China becomes the focal point of US security concerns,94 the US government will 
probably have another reason to prioritize military capabilities for war-fighting 
against other nation-states rather than unconventional warfare and stability op-
erations. This possibility exists independent of the outcome in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, but a rejection of COIN due to US failure in those countries may converge 
with increasing concerns over China; the two factors may thus be mutually re-
inforcing in diverting US attention from COIN.
In this context, a core question is also whether US national strategic cul-
ture may evolve in a direction that is conducive to the sustained development 
of COIN capabilities and that allows repeated and sustained COIN commit-
ments. Colin S. Gray has asked whether “the American Way of War” can adapt 
to the requirements of successfully fighting irregular opponents. His answer is, 
“perhaps, but only with difficulty.”95 In a structural sense, this issue is similar 
92 For discussion of these latter scenarios, see Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon, 
“The Case for Larger Ground Forces,” Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide, April 2007 
(Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation).
93 Metz, Learning from Iraq, p. 59.
94 For discussion of the China factor see, for example, Kagan, Finding the Target, pp. 
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[The Limits of the Superpower – Perspectives on the Development of the Bush 
Doctrine], IFS Info, no. 6 (Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2006), pp. 
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2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   47 12-07-07   08:39:01
4 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy
to that of cultural adaptation on the part of the Army. However, if US national 
strategic culture does not embrace, or at least accept, COIN as an integral part 
of the nation’s security policies, developments within the Army are going to be 
less relevant. If US policy-makers and voters categorically reject US involvement 
in COIN operations, it will hardly matter how well the Army has mastered the 
skills of COIN.
In sum, there are a number of interdependent factors that will likely de-
termine the future course of the Army’s transformation into a full-blown COIN 
operations force. One thing seems to be clear: the outcome of the transitional 
process will have a tremendous impact on US military capabilities.
bIbLIOGRAPHy
ADAmS, THOmAS K.: 
The Army After Next. The First Post-Industrial Army (Westport, CT & 
London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
––– “LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz),” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 1, no. 
3 (1990).
AVANT, DEbORAH D.: 
Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
bACEVICH, ANDREW J.: 
The New American Militarism. How Americans Are Seduced By War (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2005).
––– American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
bIDDLE, STEPHEN: 
“Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (2006).
––– Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense 
Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2002).
bLACKWELL, JAmES A.: 
“Professionalism and Army Doctrine: A Losing Battle?,” in The Future of the 
Army Profession, eds. Snider, Don M. and Matthews, Lloyd J. (Boston, MA: 
McGraw-Hill; 2nd edition).
bOOT, mAx: 
The Savage Wars of Peace. Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New 
York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).
bUILDER, CARL H.: 
The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
bUNN, ELAINE m.: 
“Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?,” Strategic Forum, no. 
200, July 2003.
CAbLE, LARRy E.: 
Conflict of Myths. The Development of American Counterinsurgency and the 
Vietnam War (New York, NY & London: New York University Press, 1986).
CASSIDy, RObERT m.: 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. Military Culture and 
Irregular War (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   48 12-07-07   08:39:01
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy
to that of cultural adaptation on the part of the Army. However, if US national 
strategic culture does not embrace, or at least accept, COIN as an integral part 
of the nation’s security policies, developments within the Army are going to be 
less relevant. If US policy-makers and voters categorically reject US involvement 
in COIN operations, it will hardly matter how well the Army has mastered the 
skills of COIN.
In sum, there are a number of interdependent factors that will likely de-
termine the future course of the Army’s transformation into a full-blown COIN 
operations force. One thing seems to be clear: the outcome of the transitional 
process will have a tremendous impact on US military capabilities.
bIbLIOGRAPHy
ADAmS, THOmAS K.: 
The Army After Next. The First Post-Industrial Army (Westport, CT & 
London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
––– “LIC (Low-Intensity Clausewitz),” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 1, no. 
3 (1990).
AVANT, DEbORAH D.: 
Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
bACEVICH, ANDREW J.: 
The New American Militarism. How Americans Are Seduced By War (Oxford, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2005).
––– American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002).
bIDDLE, STEPHEN: 
“Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 2 (2006).
––– Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense 
Policy (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2002).
bLACKWELL, JAmES A.: 
“Professionalism and Army Doctrine: A Losing Battle?,” in The Future of the 
Army Profession, eds. Snider, Don M. and Matthews, Lloyd J. (Boston, MA: 
McGraw-Hill; 2nd edition).
bOOT, mAx: 
The Savage Wars of Peace. Small Wars and the Rise of American Power (New 
York, NY: Basic Books, 2002).
bUILDER, CARL H.: 
The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
bUNN, ELAINE m.: 
“Preemptive Action: When, How, and to What Effect?,” Strategic Forum, no. 
200, July 2003.
CAbLE, LARRy E.: 
Conflict of Myths. The Development of American Counterinsurgency and the 
Vietnam War (New York, NY & London: New York University Press, 1986).
CASSIDy, RObERT m.: 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror. Military Culture and 
Irregular War (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   49 12-07-07   08:39:01
50 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 5/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
––– “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency,” 
Parameters, vol. XXXVI, no. 2 (2006).
––– Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine 
and Practice after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
CORUm, JAmES S.: 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol. 28, no. 1 (2007).
CRANE, CONRAD C.: 
Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2002).
DOWNIE, RICHARD DUNCAN: 
Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the 
Drug War (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1998).
ENRIqUEz, ARNEL b.: 
”The US National Security Strategy of 2002: A New Use-of-Force Doctrine?,” 
Air & Space Power Journal, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (2004).
FASTAbEND, DAVID: 
”The Categorization of Conflict,” Parameters, vol. XXVII, no. 2 (1997) 
[online 22 June 2007], URL: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/
97summer/fastaben.htm.
FORD, CHRISTOPHER m.: 
“Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency,” 
Parameters, vol. XXXV, no. 2 (2005).
FREEDmAN, LAWRENCE: 
“Prevention, Not Preemption,” in Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime 
Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, eds. Alexander J. 
T. Lennon and Camille Eiss (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
GADDIS, JOHN LEWIS: 
Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, revised 
and expanded edition, 2005).
––– Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004).
GALLOWAy, GERALD E.: 
“Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).
GRAy, COLIN S.:
Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War 
Adapt? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War Col-
lege, 2006).
HEADqUARTERS, DEPARTmENT OF THE ARmy: 
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, 2006).
––– FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC, 2004).
––– FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC, 
2003).
KAGAN, FREDERICK W.: 
Finding the Target. The Transformation of American Military Policy (New 
York, NY: Encounter Books, 2006).
KAGAN, FREDERICK AND O’HANLON, mICHAEL: 
“The Case for Larger Ground Forces,” Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide, 
April 2007 (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation).
KILCULLEN, DAVID: 
“Counter-insurgency Redux,” Survival, vol. 48, no. 4 (2006).
KISSINGER, HENRy: 
Diplomacy (New York, NY: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster, 1994).
KREPINEVICH, JR., ANDREW F.: 
The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986).
KRONVALL, OLOF: 
“Is the Bush Doctrine an Anomaly? American Use-of-Force Doctrines from 
Vietnam to the War on Terror,” in Säkerhet och försvar. En vänbok till 
Kent Zetterberg [Security and Defense. A Festschrift to Kent Zetterberg], 
eds. Gunnar Artéus, Karl Molin and Magnus Petersson (Karlskrona: Axel 
Abrahamssons Tryckeri och förlag, 2005).
LITWAK, RObERT S.: 
Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of 
Stability, 1969–1976 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
LOCK-PULLAN, RICHARD: 
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq (London & 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
mARKS, THOmAS A.: 
“Introduction,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006).
mCNERNEy, mICHAEL J.:  
“Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a 
Muddle?,” Parameters, vol. XXXV, no. 4 (2005).
mELby, SVEIN: 
“Stormaktspolitikkens renessanse?,” [The Renaissance of Great Power Politics?] 
in Svein Melby, Johannes Rø, Olof Kronvall and Anders G. Romarheim: 
Supermaktens begrensning. Perspektiver på Bush-doktrinens utvikling [The 
Limits of the Superpower – Perspectives on the Development of the Bush 
Doctrine], IFS Info, no. 6 (Oslo, Institute for Defence Studies, 2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   50 12-07-07   08:39:01
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 515/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
––– “The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency,” 
Parameters, vol. XXXVI, no. 2 (2006).
––– Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine 
and Practice after the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004).
CORUm, JAmES S.: 
“Rethinking US Army Counter-insurgency Doctrine,” Contemporary Security 
Policy, vol. 28, no. 1 (2007).
CRANE, CONRAD C.: 
Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
2002).
DOWNIE, RICHARD DUNCAN: 
Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the 
Drug War (Westport, CN: Praeger, 1998).
ENRIqUEz, ARNEL b.: 
”The US National Security Strategy of 2002: A New Use-of-Force Doctrine?,” 
Air & Space Power Journal, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (2004).
FASTAbEND, DAVID: 
”The Categorization of Conflict,” Parameters, vol. XXVII, no. 2 (1997) 
[online 22 June 2007], URL: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/parameters/
97summer/fastaben.htm.
FORD, CHRISTOPHER m.: 
“Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population’s Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency,” 
Parameters, vol. XXXV, no. 2 (2005).
FREEDmAN, LAWRENCE: 
“Prevention, Not Preemption,” in Reshaping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime 
Change, and U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, eds. Alexander J. 
T. Lennon and Camille Eiss (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004).
GADDIS, JOHN LEWIS: 
Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, revised 
and expanded edition, 2005).
––– Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004).
GALLOWAy, GERALD E.: 
“Counterinsurgency: Relearning How to Think” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2005).
GRAy, COLIN S.:
Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War 
Adapt? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War Col-
lege, 2006).
HEADqUARTERS, DEPARTmENT OF THE ARmy: 
FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, 2006).
––– FMI 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations (Washington, DC, 2004).
––– FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (Washington, DC, 
2003).
KAGAN, FREDERICK W.: 
Finding the Target. The Transformation of American Military Policy (New 
York, NY: Encounter Books, 2006).
KAGAN, FREDERICK AND O’HANLON, mICHAEL: 
“The Case for Larger Ground Forces,” Bridging the Foreign Policy Divide, 
April 2007 (Muscatine, IA: The Stanley Foundation).
KILCULLEN, DAVID: 
“Counter-insurgency Redux,” Survival, vol. 48, no. 4 (2006).
KISSINGER, HENRy: 
Diplomacy (New York, NY: Touchstone/Simon & Schuster, 1994).
KREPINEVICH, JR., ANDREW F.: 
The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1986).
KRONVALL, OLOF: 
“Is the Bush Doctrine an Anomaly? American Use-of-Force Doctrines from 
Vietnam to the War on Terror,” in Säkerhet och försvar. En vänbok till 
Kent Zetterberg [Security and Defense. A Festschrift to Kent Zetterberg], 
eds. Gunnar Artéus, Karl Molin and Magnus Petersson (Karlskrona: Axel 
Abrahamssons Tryckeri och förlag, 2005).
LITWAK, RObERT S.: 
Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of 
Stability, 1969–1976 (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
LOCK-PULLAN, RICHARD: 
US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq (London & 
New York, NY: Routledge, 2006).
mARKS, THOmAS A.: 
“Introduction,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006).
mCNERNEy, mICHAEL J.:  
“Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a 
Muddle?,” Parameters, vol. XXXV, no. 4 (2005).
mELby, SVEIN: 
“Stormaktspolitikkens renessanse?,” [The Renaissance of Great Power Politics?] 
in Svein Melby, Johannes Rø, Olof Kronvall and Anders G. Romarheim: 
Supermaktens begrensning. Perspektiver på Bush-doktrinens utvikling [The 
Limits of the Superpower – Perspectives on the Development of the Bush 
Doctrine], IFS Info, no. 6 (Oslo, Institute for Defence Studies, 2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   51 12-07-07   08:39:01
52 OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 5/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
mELILLO, mICHAEL R.: 
“Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Parameters, vol. 
XXXVI, no. 3 (2006).
mETz, STEVEN: 
Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).
––– Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007).
––– Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
1995)
mETz, STEVEN AND mILLEN, RAymOND: 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing 
Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2004).
mOCKAITIS, THOmAS R.: 
“A New Era of COIN,” The RUSI Journal, no. 136 (September 1991).
––– The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and 
Planning for the Future (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2007).
mORRIS, mICHAEL F.: 
“Al-Qa´ida as Insurgency: The Quest for Islamic Revolution,” in Murray, 
Williamson (ed.): Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global 
War on Terror (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2006).
NAGL, JOHN A.: 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Chicago, IL & London: Chicago University Press, 2005).
O’DOWD, ED: 
Review of Nagl, John A.: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2002); 
Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006).
qUINLIVAN, JAmES T.: 
“Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, vol. XXV, no. 
4 (1995) [online 22 June 2007], URL:  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/
Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm.
RECORD, JEFFREy: 
“The American Way of War. Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgen-
cy,” Policy Briefing #577 (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 2006).
––– Dark Victory. America’s Second War Against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2004).
––– Making War, Thinking History. Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of 
Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).
REED, JAmES W.: 
“Should Deterrence Fail. War Termination in Campaign Planning,” Parameters, 
vol. XXIII, no. 2 (1993) [online 22 June], URL: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/
usawc/parameters/1993/reed.htm.
ROmJUE, JOHN L.: 
American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Honolulu, HI: University 
Press of the Pacific, 1997).
RUmSFELD, DONALD H.: 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006 (Washington, DC: 
Pentagon, 2006) [QDR 2006].
SæVERAAS, TORGEIR E.: 
“Maneuver Warfare: Genghis Khan – Blitzkrieg – AirLand Battle?,” in Torgeir 
E. Sæveraas and Kjetil Henriksen: Et militært universalmiddel? Amerikansk 
“Maneuver Warfare” og norsk doktrineutvikling [A Military Panacea? 
American ‘Maneuver Warfare’ and Development of Norwegian Doctrine], Oslo 
Files on Defence and Security, no. 1 (Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies, 2007).
SCHADLOW, NADIA, CHARLES bARRy AND RICHARD LAqUEmENT: 
“A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and 
Reconstruction,” in The Future of the Army Profession, eds. Don M. Snider 
and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill; 2nd edition).
TOVO, KEN: 
“From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency 
Operations,” in Murray, Williamson (ed.): Strategic Challenges for 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006).
WEIGLEy, RUSSELL F.: 
The American Way of War. A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973).
WORLEy, D. RObERT: 
Shaping U.S. Military Forces. Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War 
World (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   52 12-07-07   08:39:01
OSLO FILES ON DefeNce aND SecurITy 535/2007 fINaLLy eaTINg SOup wITh a kNIfe?
mELILLO, mICHAEL R.: 
“Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities,” Parameters, vol. 
XXXVI, no. 3 (2006).
mETz, STEVEN: 
Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).
––– Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007).
––– Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 
1995)
mETz, STEVEN AND mILLEN, RAymOND: 
Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing 
Threat and Response (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2004).
mOCKAITIS, THOmAS R.: 
“A New Era of COIN,” The RUSI Journal, no. 136 (September 1991).
––– The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and 
Planning for the Future (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 
Army War College, 2007).
mORRIS, mICHAEL F.: 
“Al-Qa´ida as Insurgency: The Quest for Islamic Revolution,” in Murray, 
Williamson (ed.): Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global 
War on Terror (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2006).
NAGL, JOHN A.: 
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya 
and Vietnam (Chicago, IL & London: Chicago University Press, 2005).
O’DOWD, ED: 
Review of Nagl, John A.: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and 
Vietnam. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CN: Praeger, 2002); 
Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 17, no. 1 (2006).
qUINLIVAN, JAmES T.: 
“Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” Parameters, vol. XXV, no. 
4 (1995) [online 22 June 2007], URL:  http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/
Parameters/1995/quinliv.htm.
RECORD, JEFFREy: 
“The American Way of War. Cultural Barriers to Successful Counterinsurgen-
cy,” Policy Briefing #577 (Washington, D.C.: The Cato Institute, 2006).
––– Dark Victory. America’s Second War Against Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2004).
––– Making War, Thinking History. Munich, Vietnam, and Presidential Uses of 
Force from Korea to Kosovo (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2002).
REED, JAmES W.: 
“Should Deterrence Fail. War Termination in Campaign Planning,” Parameters, 
vol. XXIII, no. 2 (1993) [online 22 June], URL: http://carlisle-www.army.mil/
usawc/parameters/1993/reed.htm.
ROmJUE, JOHN L.: 
American Army Doctrine for the Post-Cold War (Honolulu, HI: University 
Press of the Pacific, 1997).
RUmSFELD, DONALD H.: 
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006 (Washington, DC: 
Pentagon, 2006) [QDR 2006].
SæVERAAS, TORGEIR E.: 
“Maneuver Warfare: Genghis Khan – Blitzkrieg – AirLand Battle?,” in Torgeir 
E. Sæveraas and Kjetil Henriksen: Et militært universalmiddel? Amerikansk 
“Maneuver Warfare” og norsk doktrineutvikling [A Military Panacea? 
American ‘Maneuver Warfare’ and Development of Norwegian Doctrine], Oslo 
Files on Defence and Security, no. 1 (Oslo, Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies, 2007).
SCHADLOW, NADIA, CHARLES bARRy AND RICHARD LAqUEmENT: 
“A Return to the Army’s Roots: Governance, Stabilization, and 
Reconstruction,” in The Future of the Army Profession, eds. Don M. Snider 
and Lloyd J. Matthews (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill; 2nd edition).
TOVO, KEN: 
“From the Ashes of the Phoenix: Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgency 
Operations,” in Murray, Williamson (ed.): Strategic Challenges for 
Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror (Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006).
WEIGLEy, RUSSELL F.: 
The American Way of War. A History of United States Military Strategy and 
Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973).
WORLEy, D. RObERT: 
Shaping U.S. Military Forces. Revolution or Relevance in a Post-Cold War 
World (Westport, CT & London: Praeger Security International, 2006).
OF_5_2007_Innhold.indd   53 12-07-07   08:39:02
